Related papers: Learning to Play Multi-Follower Bayesian Stackelbe…
Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…
We consider the online distributed non-stochastic experts problem, where the distributed system consists of one coordinator node that is connected to $k$ sites, and the sites are required to communicate with each other via the coordinator.…
We study agents communicating over an underlying network by exchanging messages, in order to optimize their individual regret in a common nonstochastic multi-armed bandit problem. We derive regret minimization algorithms that guarantee for…
We investigate the problem of cumulative regret minimization for individual sequence prediction with respect to the best expert in a finite family of size K under limited access to information. We assume that in each round, the learner can…
We study a sequential decision problem where the learner faces a sequence of $K$-armed bandit tasks. The task boundaries might be known (the bandit meta-learning setting), or unknown (the non-stationary bandit setting). For a given integer…
Inspired by a military context, we study a Stackelberg production game where a country's government, the leader, wants to maximize the production of military assets. The leader does so by allocating his resources among a set of production…
In this paper, we are concerned with the stabilizatbility of Stackelberg game-based systems. In particular, two players are involved in the system where one is the follower to minimize the related cost function and the other is the leader…
We consider a common case of the combinatorial semi-bandit problem, the $m$-set semi-bandit, where the learner exactly selects $m$ arms from the total $d$ arms. In the adversarial setting, the best regret bound, known to be…
This paper considers two investors who perform mean-variance portfolio selection with asymmetric information: one knows the true stock dynamics, while the other has to infer the true dynamics from observed stock evolution. Their portfolio…
We study policy optimization in Stackelberg mean field games (MFGs), a hierarchical framework for modeling the strategic interaction between a single leader and an infinitely large population of homogeneous followers. The objective can be…
In this study, we explore the application of game theory, in particular Stackelberg games, to address the issue of effective coordination strategy generation for heterogeneous robots with one-way communication. To that end, focusing on the…
Bayesian games model interactive decision-making where players have incomplete information -- e.g., regarding payoffs and private data on players' strategies and preferences -- and must actively reason and update their belief models (with…
We consider the problem of online combinatorial optimization under semi-bandit feedback. The goal of the learner is to sequentially select its actions from a combinatorial decision set so as to minimize its cumulative loss. We propose a…
We study online reinforcement learning in linear Markov decision processes with adversarial losses and bandit feedback, without prior knowledge on transitions or access to simulators. We introduce two algorithms that achieve improved regret…
Stackelberg games, widely applied in domains like economics and security, involve asymmetric interactions where a leader's strategy drives follower responses. Accurately modeling these dynamics allows domain experts to optimize strategies…
We consider the Scale-Free Adversarial Multi Armed Bandits(MAB) problem. At the beginning of the game, the player only knows the number of arms $n$. It does not know the scale and magnitude of the losses chosen by the adversary or the…
This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg game of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs), where the coefficients of the backward system and the cost functionals are deterministic, and the control domain is convex. Necessary and…
Motivated by the question of how a principal can maximize its utility in repeated interactions with a learning agent, we study repeated games between an principal and an agent employing a mean-based learning algorithm. Prior work has shown…
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal…
This paper addresses a Stackelberg stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) differential game under closed-loop information, a problem inherently time-inconsistent. Existing approaches rely on solving two coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)…