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Related papers: Multiple Concurrent Proposers: Why and How

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We analyze maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This concurrency breaks the single builder assumption of…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-11-18 Steven Landers , Benjamin Marsh

Modern blockchains increasingly adopt multi-proposer (MCP) consensus to remove single-leader bottlenecks and improve censorship resistance. However, MCP alone does not resolve how users should disseminate transactions to proposers. Today,…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-12-30 Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa , Benjamin Marsh , Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias , Alberto Sonnino

Maximal extractable value (MEV) in which block proposers unethically gain profits by manipulating the order in which transactions are included within a block, is a key challenge facing blockchains such as Ethereum today. Left unchecked, MEV…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-05-16 Yifan Mao , Mengya Zhang , Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan , Zhiqiang Lin

Maximal Extractable Value, or MEV, remains a structural threat to blockchain fairness because a block producer can often observe pending transactions and unilaterally decide their ordering or inclusion. Existing mitigations hide transaction…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2026-04-10 Jian Sheng Wang

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) is value extractable by temporary monopoly power commonly found in decentralized systems. This extraction stems from a lack of user privacy upon transaction submission and the ability of a monopolist…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-09-26 Tarun Chitra

Blockchains offer strong security guarantees, but they cannot protect the ordering of transactions. Powerful players, such as miners, sequencers, and sophisticated bots, can reap significant profits by selectively including, excluding, or…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-10-24 Sen Yang , Fan Zhang , Ken Huang , Xi Chen , Youwei Yang , Feng Zhu

Blockchain systems that settle financial transactions face a structural tension: the single validator that assembles each block holds unilateral power over transaction inclusion and ordering. Traditional markets curb this very power through…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2026-05-25 Daniel Cason , Gordon Liao , Sergio Mena , Nenad Milošević , Adi Seredinschi , Alessandro Sforzin , João Sousa , Preston Vander Vos

Block production on the Ethereum blockchain has adopted an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer--Builder Separation (PBS), where validators outsource block creation to builders competing in MEV--Boost auctions for Maximal Extractable…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-10-01 Fei Wu , Thomas Thiery , Stefanos Leonardos , Carmine Ventre

We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition, in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as Ethereum. We argue that the core is a suitable solution…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-10-01 Akaki Mamageishvili , Christoph Schlegel , Benny Sudakov , Danning Sui

Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the implementation of pro-poser/builder separation (PBS) on Ethereum,…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-06-13 Johannes Rude Jensen , Victor von Wachter , Omri Ross

We develop a formalism for reasoning about trading on decentralized exchanges on blockchains and a formulation of a particular form of maximal extractable value (MEV) that represents the total arbitrage opportunity extractable from on-chain…

Mathematical Finance · Quantitative Finance 2023-04-24 Alan Guo

In blockchain systems operating under the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism, fairness in transaction processing is essential to preserving decentralization and maintaining user trust. However, with the emergence of Maximal…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2026-01-21 Yitian Wang , Yebo Feng , Yingjiu Li , Jiahua Xu

Blockchains have popularized automated market makers (AMMs). An AMM exchange is an application running on a blockchain which maintains a pool of crypto-assets and automatically trades assets with users governed by some pricing function that…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-09-16 T-H. Hubert Chan , Ke Wu , Elaine Shi

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a critical issue for blockchain ecosystems, as it enables validators or block proposers to extract value by ordering, including or censoring users' transactions. This paper aims to present a formal…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-06-30 Bruno Mazorra , Nicolás Della Penna

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) represents billions of dollars in extracted value that fundamentally shapes blockchain network dynamics and participant incentives. While research has focused on MEV extraction and mitigation, we lack…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2026-05-01 Andrei Seoev , Dmitry Belousov , Anastasiia Smirnova , Ksenia Kurinova , Aleksei Smirnov , Denis Fedyanin , Yury Yanovich

As blockchains begin processing significant economic activity, the ability to include and order transactions inevitably becomes highly valuable, a concept known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). This makes effective mechanisms for…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2025-04-25 Robin Fritsch , Maria Inês Silva , Akaki Mamageishvili , Benjamin Livshits , Edward W. Felten

Modern blockchains guarantee that submitted transactions will be included eventually; a property formally known as liveness. But financial activity requires transactions to be included in a timely manner. Unfortunately, classical liveness…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2023-06-27 Elijah Fox , Mallesh Pai , Max Resnick

In this article, we develop an interdisciplinary analysis of MEV which desires to merge the gap that exists between technical and legal research supporting policymakers in their regulatory decisions concerning blockchains, DeFi and…

Computers and Society · Computer Science 2023-05-08 Simona Ramos , Joshua Ellul

Blockchains have popularized the Automated Market Makers (AMMs), where users trade crypto-assets directly with a smart contract, governed by a pricing function embedded in the contract's code. Today, users of AMMs are often forced to accept…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2026-05-28 Yuhao Li , Elaine Shi , Mengqian Zhang

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to a wide class of economic attacks to public blockchains, where adversaries with the power to reorder, drop or insert transactions in a block can "extract" value from smart contracts. Empirical…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2026-02-04 Massimo Bartoletti , Roberto Zunino
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