Related papers: Multi-Head Finite-State Dimension
This study aims to reinforce the theoretical foundation for diverse systems--including the axiomatic definition of intelligence--by introducing a mathematically rigorous and unified formal structure for the concept of 'state,' which has…
We introduce a class of multiqubit quantum states which generalizes graph states. These states correspond to an underlying mathematical hypergraph, i.e. a graph where edges connecting more than two vertices are considered. We derive a…
We introduce the first complete formal solution to corrigibility in the off-switch game, with provable guarantees in multi-step, partially observed environments. Our framework consists of five *structurally separate* utility heads --…
In this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with the risk-sensitive optimality criterion. We introduce risk-sensitivity behaviour for each agent via an exponential utility function. In the game model, each…
Here, we examine a mean-field game (MFG) that models the economic growth of a population of non-cooperative rational agents. In this MFG, agents are described by two state variables - the capital and consumer goods they own. Each agent…
Control of multi-agent systems via game theory is investigated. Assume a system level object is given, the utility functions for individual agents are designed to convert a multi-agent system into a potential game. First, for fixed…
We introduce a multivariate multidimensional mixed-effects regression model in a finite mixture framework. We relax the usual unidimensionality assumption on the random effects multivariate distribution. Thus, we introduce a…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
First order kinetic mean field games formally describe the Nash equilibria of deterministic differential games where agents control their acceleration, asymptotically in the limit as the number of agents tends to infinity. The known results…
We give a sufficient condition for the Fourier dimension of a countable union of sets to equal the supremum of the Fourier dimensions of the sets in the union, and show by example that the Fourier dimension is not countably stable in…
A 1952 result of Davenport and Erd\H{o}s states that if $p$ is an integer-valued polynomial, then the real number $0.p(1)p(2)p(3)\dots$ is Borel normal in base ten. A later result of Nakai and Shiokawa extends this result to polynomials…
We consider mean field games with discrete state spaces (called discrete mean field games in the following) and we analyze these games in continuous and discrete time, over finite as well as infinite time horizons. We prove the existence of…
We settle a conjecture by Bik and Marigliano stating that the degree of a one-dimensional discrete model with rational maximum likelihood estimator is bounded above by a linear function in the size of its support, therefore showing that…
We consider a deterministic mean field games problem in which a typical agent solves an optimal control problem where the dynamics is affine with respect to the control and the cost functional has a growth which is polynomial with respect…
Effective dimension has proven very useful in geometric measure theory through the point-to-set principle \cite{LuLu18}\ that characterizes Hausdorff dimension by relativized effective dimension. Finite-state dimension is the least…
Differences in perception, information asymmetries, and bounded rationality lead game-theoretic players to derive a private, subjective view of the game that may diverge from the underlying ground-truth scenario and may be misaligned with…
We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…
We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable…
We use a simple N-player stochastic game with idiosyncratic and common noises to introduce the concept of Master Equation originally proposed by Lions in his lectures at the Coll\`ege de France. Controlling the limit N tends to the infinity…
We consider a large random network, in which the performance of a node depends upon that of its neighbours and some external random influence factors. This results in random vector valued fixed-point (FP) equations in large dimensional…