Related papers: An orderly algorithm for generation of Condorcet D…
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever voters' preferences are restricted to the domain, the pairwise majority relation (for an odd number of voters) is transitive and hence a linear order. Determining…
A Condorcet domain (CD) is a collection of linear orders on a set of candidates satisfying the following property: for any choice of preferences of voters from this collection, a simple majority rule does not yield cycles. We propose a…
Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations arising in voting theory: regarding their permutations as preference orders on a list of candidates, one avoids Condorcet's paradox when aggregating the preferences via a simple majority…
A Condorcet domain is a collection of linear orders which satisfy an acyclic majority relation. In this paper we describe domains as collections of directed Hamilton paths. We prove that while Black's single-peaked domains are defined by…
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever the preferences of all voters belong to this set, the majority relation has no cycles. We observe that, without loss of generality, such domain can be assumed to…
Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked on a…
In this paper we consider a Condorcet domain (CD) formed by a rhombus tiling as a voting design and consider a problem of aggregation of voting designs using majority rule. A Condorcet super-domain is a collection of CDs obtained from…
Winner selection by majority, in an election between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with democratic principles. Instead, when the candidates are three or more and the voters rank candidates in order of preference, there are no…
One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom is known as strategyproofness and turns out to be rather…
Mathematical morphology provides a nonlinear framework for image and spatial data processing and analysis. Although there have been many successful applications of mathematical morphology to vector-valued images, such as color and…
The study of large Condorcet domains (CD) has been a significant area of interest in voting theory. In this paper, our goal is to search for large CDs that are hitherto unknown. With a straightforward combinatorial definition, searching for…
We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordinal preferences over the alternatives. We consider several voting mechanisms: plurality voting and approval voting with deterministic or uniform tie-breaking rules. We…
We introduce BallotRank, a ranked preference aggregation method derived from a modified PageRank algorithm. It is a Condorcet-consistent method without damping, and empirical examination of nearly 2,000 ranked choice elections and over…
We study matching problems in which agents form one side of a bipartite graph and have preferences over objects on the other side. A central solution concept in this setting is popularity: a matching is popular if it is a (weak) Condorcet…
Condorcet's paradox is a fundamental result in social choice theory which states that there exist elections in which, no matter which candidate wins, a majority of voters prefer a different candidate. In fact, even if we can select any $k$…
Inspecting known maximal Condorcet domains on 4 variables classified by Tobias Dittrich we find that 9 out of 18 of them are created using a certain composition of smaller domains. In this paper we describe this composition. We give…
A Condorcet winning set is a set of candidates such that no other candidate is preferred by at least half the voters over all members of the set. The Condorcet dimension, which is the minimum cardinality of a Condorcet winning set, is known…
A Condorcet winning set addresses the Condorcet paradox by selecting a few candidates--rather than a single winner--such that no unselected alternative is preferred to all of them by a majority of voters. This idea extends to…
In an election where $n$ voters rank $m$ candidates, a Condorcet winning set is a committee of $k$ candidates such that for any outside candidate, a majority of voters prefer some committee member. Condorcet's paradox shows that some…
Inspired by [4] we present a new algorithm for uniformly random generation of ordered trees in which all occuring outdegrees can be specified by a given sequence of numbers. The method can be used for random generation of binary or n-ary…