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The sustainable management of common resources often leads to a social dilemma known as the tragedy of the commons: individuals benefit from rapid extraction of resources, while communities as a whole benefit from more sustainable…
The classical idea of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) modeling animal behavior does not involve any spatial dependence. We considered a spatial Hawk-Dove game played by animals in a patchy environment with wrap around boundaries. We…
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of…
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…
A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation, even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used in evolutionary game theory to study the…
In the animal world, the competition between individuals belonging to different species for a resource often requires the cooperation of several individuals in groups. This paper proposes a generalization of the Hawk-Dove Game for an…
Evolutionary competition often occurs simultaneously at multiple levels of organization, in which traits or behaviors that are costly for an individual can provide collective benefits to groups to which the individual belongs. Building off…
The emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is a fascinating topic in evolutionary biology and social science. The public goods game (PGG) is a paradigm for exploring cooperative behavior. In PGG, the total resulting payoff is…
In this paper, we consider a two-player two-strategy game with random payoffs in a population subdivided into $d$ demes, each containing $N$ individuals at the beginning of any given generation and experiencing local extinction and…
We propose a stochastic model in evolutionary game theory where individuals (or subpopulations) can mutate changing their strategies randomly (but rarely) and explore the external environment. This environment affects the selective pressure…
Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spatial domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with their neighbors. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations…
We explore the Hawk-Dove game on networks with topologies ranging from regular lattices to random graphs with small-world networks in between. This is done by means of computer simulations using several update rules for the population…
We revisit the original hawk-dove game with slight modifications to payoff values while maintaining the fundamental principles of interaction. The practical robustness of the theoretical tools of game theory is tested on a simulated…
Many existing studies on pattern formation in the reaction-diffusion systems rely on deterministic models. However, environmental noise is often a major factor which leads to significant changes in the spatiotemporal dynamics. In this…
The costly provision of public goods serves as a model problem for the evolution of cooperative behavior, presenting a social dilemma between the collective benefits of shared resources and the individual incentive to free-ride in resource…
Evolutionary $2 \times 2$ games are studied with players located on a square lattice. During the evolution the randomly chosen neighboring players try to maximize their collective income by adopting a random strategy pair with a probability…
Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
Spatial evolutionary games provide a valuable framework for elucidating the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior. However, most previous studies assume that individuals are profiteers and neglect to consider the effects of…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…