Related papers: Exploiting Page Faults for Covert Communication

Covert communication is the undetected transmission of sensitive information over a communication channel. In wireless communication systems, channel impairments such as signal fading present challenges in the effective implementation and…

We consider covert communication using a queuing timing channel in the presence of a warden. The covert message is encoded using the inter-arrival times of the packets, and the legitimate receiver and the warden observe the inter-departure…

We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe…

Air-gapped systems are disconnected from the Internet and other networks because they contain or process sensitive data. However, it is known that attackers can use computer speakers to leak data via sound to circumvent the air-gap defense.…

Timing channels are information flows, encoded in the relative timing of events, that bypass the system's protection mechanisms. Any microarchitectural state that depends on execution history and affects the rate of progress of later…

Website fingerprinting attacks, which use statistical analysis on network traffic to compromise user privacy, have been shown to be effective even if the traffic is sent over anonymity-preserving networks such as Tor. The classical attack…

Covert communication aims to shield the very existence of wireless transmissions in order to guarantee a strong security in wireless networks. In this work, for the first time we examine the possibility and achievable performance of covert…

Timing side channels have been used to extract cryptographic keys and sensitive documents, even from trusted enclaves. In this paper, we focus on cache side channels created by access to shared code or data in the memory hierarchy. This…

Page Frame Cache (PFC) is a purely software cache, present in modern Linux based operating systems (OS), which stores the page frames that are recently being released by the processes running on a particular CPU. In this paper, we show that…

Many organizations protect secure networked devices from non-secure networked devices by assigning each class of devices to a different logical network. These two logical networks, commonly called the host network and the guest network, use…

Speculation is key to achieving high CPU performance, yet it enables risks like Spectre attacks which remain a significant challenge to mitigate without incurring substantial performance overheads. These attacks typically unfold in three…

The complexity of modern processor architectures has given rise to sophisticated interactions among their components. Such interactions may result in potential attack vectors in terms of side channels, possibly available to user-land…

Security issues in MANET are a challenging task nowadays. MANETs are vulnerable to passive attacks and active attacks because of a limited number of resources and lack of centralized authority. Blackhole attack is an attack in network layer…

Spectre, Meltdown, and related attacks have demonstrated that kernels, hypervisors, trusted execution environments, and browsers are prone to information disclosure through micro-architectural weaknesses. However, it remains unclear as to…

Side-channel attacks on memory (SCAM) exploit unintended data leaks from memory subsystems to infer sensitive information, posing significant threats to system security. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities in memory access patterns, cache…

Timekeeping is a fundamental component of modern computing; however, the security of system time remains an overlooked attack surface, leaving critical systems vulnerable to manipulation.

This paper presents new methods enabling anonymous communication on the Internet. We describe a new protocol that allows us to create an anonymous overlay network by exploiting the web browsing activities of regular users. We show that the…

We study implementations of basic fault-tolerant primitives, such as consensus and registers, in message-passing systems subject to process crashes and a broad range of communication failures. Our results characterize the necessary and…

The paper demonstrates how traffic load of a shared packet queue can be exploited as a side channel through which protected information leaks to an off-path attacker. The attacker sends to a victim a sequence of identical spoofed segments.…

CPUs provide isolation mechanisms like virtualization and privilege levels to protect software. Yet these focus on architectural isolation while typically overlooking microarchitectural side channels, exemplified by Meltdown and Foreshadow.…