Related papers: A Note on Qualified Majority Voting Rules
Among two-candidate elections that treat the candidates symmetrically and never result in a tie, which voting rules are fair? A natural requirement is that each voter exerts an equal influence over the outcome, i.e., is equally likely to…
Approval voting is a common method of preference aggregation where voters vote by ``approving'' of a subset of candidates and the winner(s) are those who are approved of by the largest number of voters. In approval voting, the degree to…
It is common that a jury must grade a set of candidates in a cardinal scale such as {1,2,3,4,5} or an ordinal scale such as {Great, Good, Average, Bad }. When the number of candidates is very large such as hotels (BOOKING), restaurants…
Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial…
We study a variant of the voter model on a coevolving network in which interactions of two individuals with differing opinions only lead to an agreement on one of these opinions with a fixed probability $q$. Otherwise, with probability…
We propose a quantum voting system, in the spirit of quantum games such as the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma. Our scheme enables a constitution to violate a quantum analog of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Arrow's Theorem is a claim proved…
Even though proportional representation is a fundamental goal in multiwinner voting and a plethora of proportionality notions has been introduced, the normative justifications for choosing one notion over another remain poorly understood.…
We examine vote delegation when preferences of agents are private information. One group of agents (delegators) does not want to participate in voting and abstains under conventional voting or can delegate its votes to the other group…
Each voter $i \in I$ has $\alpha_i$ cards that (s)he distributes among the candidates $a \in A$ as a measure of approval. One (or several) candidate(s) who received the maximum number of cards is (are) elected. We provide polynomial…
The $q$-voter model with independence is generalized to signed random graphs and studied by means of Monte Carlo simulations and theoretically using the mean field approximation and different forms of the pair approximation. In the signed…
In social choice there often arises a conflict between the majority principle (the search for a candidate that is as good as possible for as many voters as possible), and the protection of minority rights (choosing a candidate that is not…
Sharing correlated random variables is a resource for a number of information theoretic tasks such as privacy amplification, simultaneous message passing, secret sharing and many more. In this article, we show that to establish such a…
We prove that, for any given set of networks satisfying suitable conditions, the net-oudegree network solution, the net-indegree network solution, and the total network solution are the unique network solutions on that set satisfying…
When voter preferences are known in an incomplete (partial) manner, winner determination is commonly treated as the identification of the necessary and possible winners; these are the candidates who win in all completions or at least one…
We present a simple proof of a well-known axiomatic characterization of state-salient decision rules, using Weak Dominance Criterion and Global Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Subsequently we provide a simple axiomatic…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random…
We focus on the following natural question: is it possible to influence the outcome of a voting process through the strategic provision of information to voters who update their beliefs rationally? We investigate whether it is…
The well-known Condorcet's Jury theorem posits that the majority rule selects the best alternative among two available options with probability one, as the population size increases to infinity. We study this result under an asymmetric…
Committee-selection problems arise in many contexts and applications, and there has been increasing interest within the social choice research community on identifying which properties are satisfied by different multi-winner voting rules.…
Epistemic social choice aims at unveiling a hidden ground truth given votes, which are interpreted as noisy signals about it. We consider here a simple setting where votes consist of approval ballots: each voter approves a set of…