Related papers: Discrepancy And Fair Division For Non-Additive Val…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and chores under category constraints. Specifically, there are $n$ agents and $m$ indivisible items which are partitioned into categories with associated capacities. An allocation…
We consider allocating indivisible goods with provable fairness guarantees that are satisfied regardless of which bundle of items each agent receives. Symmetrical allocations of this type are known to exist for divisible resources, such as…
Several fairness concepts have been proposed recently in attempts to approximate envy-freeness in settings with indivisible goods. Among them, the concept of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is arguably the closest to envy-freeness.…
A fair clustering instance is given a data set $A$ in which every point is assigned some color. Colors correspond to various protected attributes such as sex, ethnicity, or age. A fair clustering is an instance where membership of points in…
In the $k$-committee election problem, we wish to aggregate the preferences of $n$ agents over a set of alternatives and select a committee of $k$ alternatives that minimizes the cost incurred by the agents. While we typically assume that…
We prove new bounds on the average sensitivity of the indicator function of an intersection of $k$ halfspaces. In particular, we prove the optimal bound of $O(\sqrt{n\log(k)})$. This generalizes a result of Nazarov, who proved the analogous…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a multiset $M$ of $m$ indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive valuations. Specifically, we introduce a parameter $t$ for the number of distinct types of items and study fair allocations of…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that…
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under an additional constraint: there is an undirected graph describing the relationship between the items, and each agent's share must form a connected subgraph of this graph. This framework…
In this article we propose a probabilistic framework in order to study the fair division of a divisible good, e.g., a cake, between n players. Our framework follows the same idea than the ''Full independence model'' used in the study of…
We analyze the run-time complexity of computing allocations that are both fair and maximize the utilitarian social welfare, defined as the sum of agents' utilities. We focus on two tractable fairness concepts: envy-freeness up to one item…
We study the question of dividing a collection of indivisible goods amongst a set of agents. The main objective of research in the area is to achieve one of two goals: fairness or efficiency. On the fairness side, envy-freeness is the…
We prove an upper bound for the number of representations of a positive integer $N$ as the sum of four $k$-th powers of integers of size at most $B$, using a new version of the Determinant method developed by Heath-Brown, along with recent…
We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive utilities. It is desirable for the allocation to be both fair and efficient, which we formalize through the notions of envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality.…
Given a 2-edge-coloring $f : E(K_n) \rightarrow \{\pm 1\}$, the discrepancy of a subgraph $F \subseteq K_n$ is defined as $\left| \sum_{e \in E(F)} f(e) \right|$. Erd\H{o}s, F\"uredi, Loebl and S\'os showed that if $F$ is an $n$-vertex tree…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents in a fair manner. While envy-free allocations of indivisible goods are not guaranteed to exist, envy-freeness can be achieved by additionally providing some subsidy to the…
We study the classic problem of dividing a collection of indivisible resources in a fair and efficient manner among a set of agents having varied preferences. Pareto optimality is a standard notion of economic efficiency, which states that…
Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a $t$-regular hypergraph on $n$ vertices and $m$ edges. Let $M$ be the $m \times n$ incidence matrix of $\mathcal{H}$ and let us denote $\lambda =\max_{v \perp \overline{1},\|v\| = 1}\|Mv\|$. We show that the…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items subject to conflict constraints. In this framework, the items are represented as the vertices of a graph, with edges corresponding to conflicts between pairs of items. Each agent is assigned…