Related papers: Discrepancy And Fair Division For Non-Additive Val…
In the allocation of resources to a set of agents, how do fairness guarantees impact the social welfare? A quantitative measure of this impact is the price of fairness, which measures the worst-case loss of social welfare due to fairness…
As the most powerful tool in discrepancy theory, the partial coloring method has wide applications in many problems including the Beck-Fiala problem and Spencer's celebrated result. Currently, there are two major algorithmic methods for the…
We formulate the problem of fair and efficient completion of indivisible goods, defined as follows: Given a partial allocation of indivisible goods among agents, does there exist an allocation of the remaining goods (i.e., a completion)…
We consider the fundamental problem of allocating $T$ indivisible items that arrive over time to $n$ agents with additive preferences, with the goal of minimizing envy. This problem is tightly connected to online multicolor discrepancy:…
When dividing items among agents, two of the most widely studied fairness notions are envy-freeness and proportionality. We consider a setting where $m$ chores are allocated to $n$ agents and the disutility of each chore for each agent is…
We consider the fair division problem of indivisible items. It is well-known that an envy-free allocation may not exist, and a relaxed version of envy-freeness, envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), has been widely considered. In an EF1…
We show how to select an item with the majority color from $n$ two-colored items, given access to the items only through an oracle that returns the discrepancy of subsets of $k$ items. We use $n/\lfloor\tfrac{k}{2}\rfloor+O(k)$ queries,…
In this article we study a cake cutting problem. More precisely, we study symmetric fair division algorithms, that is to say we study algorithms where the order of the players do not influence the value obtained by each player. In the first…
We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valuations are provided as inputs to the algorithm. In this…
Motivated by a partition inequality of Bessenrodt and Ono, we obtain analogous inequalities for $k$-colored partition functions $p_{-k}(n)$ for all $k\geq2$. This enables us to extend the $k$-colored partition function multiplicatively to a…
We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy,…
Our work studies the fair allocation of indivisible items to a set of agents, and falls within the scope of establishing improved approximation guarantees. It is well known by now that the classic solution concepts in fair division, such as…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with subadditive valuations in a fair and efficient manner. Envy-Freeness up to any good (EFX) is the most compelling notion of fairness in the context of…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods with variable groups. In this model, the goal is to partition the agents into groups of given sizes and allocate the goods to the groups in a fair manner. We show that for any number of…
The notion of \emph{envy-freeness} is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are unfortunately not guaranteed to exist. Classical works have avoided this issue by…
The classic cake-cutting problem provides a model for addressing fair and efficient allocation of a divisible, heterogeneous resource (metaphorically, the cake) among agents with distinct preferences. Focusing on a standard formulation of…
A vertex colouring of a graph is \emph{nonrepetitive} if there is no path for which the first half of the path is assigned the same sequence of colours as the second half. The \emph{nonrepetitive chromatic number} of a graph $G$ is the…
In this paper, we consider the classic fair division problem of allocating $m$ divisible items to $n$ agents with linear valuations over the items. We define novel notions of fair shares from the perspective of individual agents via the…
With spectrum auctions as our prime motivation, in this paper we analyze combinatorial auctions where agents' valuations exhibit complementarities. Assuming that the agents only value bundles of size at most $k$ and also assuming that we…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the \emph{balanced…