Related papers: Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability
We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…
Whether a population of decision-making individuals will reach a state of satisfactory decisions is a fundamental problem in studying collective behaviors. In the framework of evolutionary game theory and by means of potential functions,…
Recently, the eco-evolutionary game theory which describes the coupled dynamics of strategies and environment have attracted great attention. At the same time, most of the current work is focused on the classic two-player two-strategy game.…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
In stochastic games with incomplete information, the uncertainty is evoked by the lack of knowledge about a player's own and the other players' types, i.e. the utility function and the policy space, and also the inherent stochasticity of…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
In statistical inference, it is rarely realistic that the hypothesized statistical model is well-specified, and consequently it is important to understand the effects of misspecification on inferential procedures. When the hypothesized…
In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…
We present a novel approach allowing the study of rare events like fixation under fluctuating environments, modeled as extrinsic noise, in evolutionary processes characterized by the dominance of one species. Our treatment consists of…
We introduce a new hypothesis testing-based learning dynamics in which players update their strategies by combining hypothesis testing with utility-driven exploration. In this dynamics, each player forms beliefs about opponents' strategies…
We study the distribution of strategies in a large game that models how agents choose among different double auction markets. We classify the possible mean field Nash equilibria, which include potentially segregated states where an agent…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
A general framework of evolutionary dynamics under heterogeneous populations is presented. The framework allows continuously many types of heterogeneous agents, heterogeneity both in payoff functions and in revision protocols and the entire…
The key challenge in multiagent learning is learning a best response to the behaviour of other agents, which may be non-stationary: if the other agents adapt their strategy as well, the learning target moves. Disparate streams of research…
Mating preferences of many biological species are not constant but season-dependent. Within the framework of evolutionary game theory this can be modeled with two finite opposite-sex populations playing against each other following the…
This paper studies a duopoly investment model with uncertainty. There are two alternative irreversible investments. The first firm to invest gets a monopoly benefit for a specified period of time. The second firm to invest gets information…
This paper explores a novel extension of dynamic matching theory by analyzing a three-way matching problem involving agents from three distinct populations, each with two possible types. Unlike traditional static or two-way dynamic models,…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…