Related papers: Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability
This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in games with continuous action sets. For concreteness, we focus on learning via "dual averaging", a widely used class of no-regret learning schemes where players take small steps…
Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has…
We consider the following two-player game: using observational data, the leader chooses a prediction function for a response variable $Y$ from given covariates. The follower then reacts with an intervention on some covariates in the…
The effect of population heterogeneity in multi-agent learning is practically relevant but remains far from being well-understood. Motivated by this, we introduce a model of multi-population learning that allows for heterogeneous beliefs…
In dynamic settings each economic agent's choices can be revealing of her private information. This elicitation via the rationalization of observable behavior depends each agent's perception of which payoff-relevant contingencies other…
We examine settings in which agents choose behaviors and care about their neighbors' behaviors, but have incomplete information about the network in which they are embedded. We develop a model in which agents use local knowledge of their…
We consider the problem of learning stable matchings with unknown preferences in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, where "decentralized" means that players make decisions individually without the influence of a central platform, and…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…
We study the behavioral implications of Rationality and Common Strong Belief in Rationality (RCSBR) with contextual assumptions allowing players to entertain misaligned beliefs, i.e., players can hold beliefs concerning their opponents'…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…
Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests repeated interactions also foster fairness. This study…
Dynamic decision-making under model uncertainty is central to many economic environments, yet existing bandit and reinforcement learning algorithms rely on the assumption of correct model specification. This paper studies the behavior and…
It has a long tradition to study trust behavior among humans or artificial agents by investigating the trust game. Although previous studies based on evolutionary game theory have revealed that trust and trustworthiness can be promoted if…
This work introduces a unified framework for analyzing games in greater depth. In the existing literature, players' strategies are typically assigned scalar values, and equilibrium concepts are used to identify compatible choices. However,…
Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity…
We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
Predicting competitive outcomes typically requires fitting dynamical models to data, from which interaction strengths and coexistence indicators such as invasion criteria can be produced. Methods that allow to propagate parameter…