Related papers: Zero-sum turn games using Q-learning: finite compu…
We introduce quantitative reductions, a novel technique for structuring the space of quantitative games and solving them that does not rely on a reduction to qualitative games. We show that such reductions exhibit the same desirable…
Reinforcement learning (RL) so far has limited real-world applications. One key challenge is that typical RL algorithms heavily rely on a reset mechanism to sample proper initial states; these reset mechanisms, in practice, are expensive to…
Two-player games such as board games have long been used as traditional benchmarks for reinforcement learning. This work revisits a policy optimization method with reverse Kullback-Leibler regularization and entropy regularization and…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has witnessed a remarkable surge in interest, fueled by the empirical success achieved in applications of single-agent reinforcement learning (RL). In this study, we consider a distributed…
In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…
In this paper, we consider the infinite-horizon reach-avoid zero-sum game problem, where the goal is to find a set in the state space, referred to as the reach-avoid set, such that the system starting at a state therein could be controlled…
The goal of this paper is to propose a new Q-learning algorithm with a dummy adversarial player, which is called dummy adversarial Q-learning (DAQ), that can effectively regulate the overestimation bias in standard Q-learning. With the…
$ $This paper addresses the inverse problem for Linear-Quadratic (LQ) nonzero-sum $N$-player differential games, where the goal is to learn parameters of an unknown cost function for the game, called observed, given the demonstrated…
Simple stochastic games are turn-based 2.5-player zero-sum graph games with a reachability objective. The problem is to compute the winning probability as well as the optimal strategies of both players. In this paper, we compare the three…
This work considers two-player zero-sum semi-Markov games with incomplete information on one side and perfect observation. At the beginning, the system selects a game type according to a given probability distribution and informs to Player…
We formulate and study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic dynamic games with partial and asymmetric information. Information asymmetry introduces fundamental challenges involving \emph{belief representation} and \emph{theory of mind}…
Reinforcement learning is a popular method of finding optimal solutions to complex problems. Algorithms like Q-learning excel at learning to solve stochastic problems without a model of their environment. However, they take longer to solve…
A number of recent studies have focused on novel features in game theory when the games are played using quantum mechanical toolbox (entanglement, unitary operators, measurement). Researchers have concentrated in two-player-two strategy,…
We study a zero-sum stochastic differential game (SDG) in which one controller plays an impulse control while their opponent plays a stochastic control. We consider an asymmetric setting in which the impulse player commits to, at the start…
Ensuring safety during reinforcement learning (RL) training is critical in real-world applications where unsafe exploration can lead to devastating outcomes. While most safe RL methods mitigate risk through constraints or penalization, they…
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, perfect information, mean payoff criteria, without any irreducibility assumption on the Markov chains associated to strategies (multichain games). The value of such…
Zero-sum stochastic games generalize the notion of Markov Decision Processes (i.e. controlled Markov chains, or stochastic dynamic programming) to the 2-player competitive case : two players jointly control the evolution of a state…
Zero-sum games are a fundamental setting for adversarial training and decision-making in multi-agent learning (MAL). Existing methods often ensure convergence to (approximate) Nash equilibria by introducing a form of regularization. Yet,…
We consider concurrent mean-payoff games, a very well-studied class of two-player (player 1 vs player 2) zero-sum games on finite-state graphs where every transition is assigned a reward between 0 and 1, and the payoff function is the…
We present BL-WoLF, a framework for learnability in repeated zero-sum games where the cost of learning is measured by the losses the learning agent accrues (rather than the number of rounds). The game is adversarially chosen from some…