Related papers: Nash Equilibrium and Belief Evolution in Different…

Claude Shannon's zero-error communication paradigm reshaped our understanding of fault-tolerant information transfer. Here, we adapt this notion into game theory with incomplete information. We ask: can players with private information…

We propose a new dynamics for equilibrium selection of finite player discrete strategy games. The dynamics is motivated by optimal transportation, and models individual players' myopicity, greedy and uncertainty when making decisions. The…

We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…

This article studies rational and persistent deception among intelligent robots to enhance security and operational efficiency. We present an N-player K-stage game with an asymmetric information structure where each robot's private…

This paper investigates the strategic concealment of environment representations used by players in competitive games. We consider a defense scenario in which one player (the Defender) seeks to infer and exploit the representation used by…

We present a subjective equilibrium notion (called "subjective equilibrium under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty (SEBEU)" for stochastic dynamic games in which each player chooses her decisions under the (incorrect) belief that a…

Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…

A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…

We present a moving target defense strategy to reduce the impact of stealthy sensor attacks on feedback systems. The defender periodically and randomly switches between thresholds from a discrete set to increase the uncertainty for the…

We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…

A repeated network game where agents have quadratic utilities that depend on information externalities -- an unknown underlying state -- as well as payoff externalities -- the actions of all other agents in the network -- is considered.…

In this paper we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games whose cost functionals are defined by a system of coupled backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence…

We study a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game where one player controls the state variable via additive impulses while the other player can stop the game at any time. The main goal of this work is characterize Nash…

We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a…

Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…

Computing Nash equilibria for strategic multi-agent systems is challenging for expensive black box systems. Motivated by the ubiquity of games involving exploitation of common resources, this paper considers the above problem for potential…

We introduce Boolean Observation Games, a subclass of multi-player finite strategic games with incomplete information and qualitative objectives. In Boolean observation games, each player is associated with a finite set of propositional…

We consider a security game in a setting consisting of two players (an attacker and a defender), each with a given budget to allocate towards attack and defense, respectively, of a set of nodes. Each node has a certain value to the attacker…

Computing an equilibrium in congestion games can be challenging when the number of players is large. Yet, it is a problem to be addressed in practice, for instance to forecast the state of the system and be able to control it. In this work,…

Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the…