Related papers: Matching to two sides
Focusing on the bipartite Stable Marriage problem, we investigate different robustness measures related to stable matchings. We analyze the computational complexity of computing them and analyze their behavior in extensive experiments on…
Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful DAs, such…
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…
Unlike the traditional model of information pull, matchmaking is base on a cooperative partnership between information providers and consumers, assisted by an intelligent facilitator (the matchmaker). Refer to some experiments, the…
A breakthrough of Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno [AKL17] found that imbalance in the number of agents on either side of a random matching market has a profound effect on the market's expected characteristics. Specifically, across all stable…
Many countries around the world, including Korea, use the school choice lottery system. However, this method has a problem in that many students are assigned to less-preferred schools based on the lottery results. In addition, the task of…
We investigate pooling problems in which multiple players vie with one another to maximize individual profit in a non-cooperative competitive market. This competitive setting is interesting and worthy of study because the majority of…
We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We…
In the real world, people/entities usually find matches independently and autonomously, such as finding jobs, partners, roommates, etc. It is possible that this search for matches starts with no initial knowledge of the environment. We…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…
Outsourcing tasks to previously unknown parties is becoming more common. One specific such problem involves matching a set of workers to a set of tasks. Even if the latter have precise requirements, the quality of individual workers is…
This paper studies the effects of altruism and spitefulness in a two-sided market in which agents behave strategically and trade according to the Shapley-Shubik mechanism. By assuming that altruistic agents have concerns for others on the…
Many interesting problems in the Internet industry can be framed as a two-sided marketplace problem. Examples include search applications and recommender systems showing people, jobs, movies, products, restaurants, etc. Incorporating…
We define and study a new variant of the secretary problem. Whereas in the classic setting multiple secretaries compete for a single position, we study the case where the secretaries arrive one at a time and are assigned, in an on-line…
We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…
We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in…
We study a dynamic non-bipartite matching problem. There is a fixed set of agent types, and agents of a given type arrive and depart according to type-specific Poisson processes. Agent departures are not announced in advance. The value of a…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…