Related papers: Choice Paralysis in Evolutionary Games
Demographic noise has profound effects on evolutionary and population dynamics, as well as on chemical reaction systems and models of epidemiology. Such noise is intrinsic and due to the discreteness of the dynamics in finite populations.…
Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by…
Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…
Standard models of population dynamics focus on the the interaction, survival, and extinction of the competing species individually. Real ecological systems, however, are characterized by an abundance of species (or strategies, in the…
Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biological, social and economical behaviors. In this paper, we develop a new approach to evaluate ESS in…
Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding $N$-player games, they are of…
We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…
We suggest a novel stochastic-approximation algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash-equilibrium strategy in a general queueing game with a finite action space. The algorithm involves a single simulation of the queueing process with dynamic…
This brief discusses evolutionary game theory as a powerful and unified mathematical tool to study evolution of collective behaviours. It summarises some of my recent research directions using evolutionary game theory methods, which include…
In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…
In [12] we formulated an evolutionary game theory model as a dynamical system on the state space of finite signed Borel measures under the weak* topology. The focus of this paper is to extend the analysis to include the long-time behavior…
In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and game theory, agents repeatedly interact and revise their strategies as new data arrives, producing a sequence of strategy profiles. This paper studies sequences of strategies satisfying a…
Static potential games are non-cooperative games which admit a fictitious function, also referred to as a potential function, such that the minimizers of this function constitute a subset (or a refinement) of the Nash equilibrium strategies…
Evolutionary $2 \times 2$ games are studied with players located on a square lattice. During the evolution the randomly chosen neighboring players try to maximize their collective income by adopting a random strategy pair with a probability…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an important solution concept in game theory which has been applied frequently to biological models. Informally an ESS is a strategy that if followed by the population cannot be taken over by a…
We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for two-player games, and we describe how it can be extended to…
Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and spatiality may lead to the…
Meirowitz [17] showed existence of continuous behavioural function equilibria for Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces. A key condition for the proof of the existence result is equi-continuity of behavioural functions…
Different evolutionary models are known to make disparate predictions for the success of an invading mutant in some situations. For example, some evolutionary mechanics lead to amplification of selection in structured populations, while…