Related papers: Competition and Incentives in a Shared Order Book
We consider the scenario where $N$ utilities strategically bid for electricity in the day-ahead market and balance the mismatch between the committed supply and actual demand in the real-time market, with uncertainty in demand and local…
We study the role of a market maker (or market operator) in a transmission constrained electricity market. We model the market as a one-shot networked Cournot competition where generators supply quantity bids and load serving entities…
We consider the design of experiments to evaluate treatments that are administered by self-interested agents, each seeking to achieve the highest evaluation and win the experiment. For example, in an advertising experiment, a company wishes…
This paper investigates the impacts of competition in autonomous mobility-on-demand systems. By adopting a network-flow based formulation, we first determine the optimal strategies of profit-maximizing platform operators in monopoly and…
The large integration of variable energy resources is expected to shift a large part of the energy exchanges closer to real-time, where more accurate forecasts are available. In this context, the short-term electricity markets and in…
We study price regulation for a monopolist operating in networked markets with demand spillovers. Achieving efficiency requires price reductions proportional to consumers' Katz-Bonacich centralities, which generally cannot be implemented by…
We study optimal contract design for large populations of heterogeneous agents whose actions generate network spillovers represented by an interaction function. In a linear-quadratic framework, we solve the finite-agent problem and its…
Horizontal agreements can fall within the scope of exemptions to antitrust competition if they are expected to create pro-consumer benefits. Inspired by such horizontal agreements, we introduce a cooperative game in which a set of transport…
In collective adaptive systems (CAS), adaptation can be implemented by optimization wrt. utility. Agents in a CAS may be self-interested, while their utilities may depend on other agents' choices. Independent optimization of agent utilities…
We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model for public expenditure without an exogenously available…
In a framework close to the one developed by Holmstr\"om and Milgrom [44], we study the optimal contracting scheme between a Principal and several Agents. Each hired Agent is in charge of one project, and can make efforts towards managing…
Modern socio-technical systems typically consist of many interconnected users and competing service providers, where notions like market equilibrium are tightly connected to the ``evolution'' of the network of users. In this paper, we model…
A network effect is introduced taking into account competition, cooperation and mixed-type interaction amongst agents along a generalized Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model. It is also argued that the presence of a market capacity enforces an…
Electricity market design that accounts for grid constraints such as voltage and thermal limits at the distribution level can increase opportunities for the grid integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs). In this paper, we consider…
We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…
We find an approximate Nash equilibrium in a game between decentralized exchanges (DEXs) that compete for order flow by setting dynamic trading fees. We characterize the equilibrium via a coupled system of partial differential equations and…
Energy prices and net power injection limitations regulate the operations in distribution grids and typically ensure that operational constraints are met. Nevertheless, unexpected or prolonged abnormal events could undermine the grid's…
We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined…
The main goal of a sequential two-stage electricity market -- e.g., day-ahead and real-time markets -- is to operate efficiently. However, the price difference across stages due to inadequate competition and unforeseen circumstances leads…
Although both data availability and the demand for accurate forecasts are increasing, collaboration between stakeholders is often constrained by data ownership and competitive interests. In contrast to recent proposals within cooperative…