Related papers: Synthesis of Sound and Precise Leakage Contracts f…
Leakage contracts have recently been proposed as a new security abstraction at the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) level. Such contracts aim to faithfully capture the information processors may leak through side effects of their…
Microarchitectural attacks compromise security by exploiting software-visible artifacts of microarchitectural optimizations such as caches and speculative execution. Defending against such attacks at the software level requires an…
There is a growing need for hardware-software contracts which precisely define the implications of microarchitecture on software security-i.e., security contracts. It is our view that such contracts should explicitly account for…
Hardware-software leakage contracts have emerged as a formalism for specifying side-channel security guarantees of modern processors, yet verifying that a complex hardware design complies with its contract remains a major challenge. While…
A promising approach to defend against side channel attacks is to build programs that are leakage resilient, in a formal sense. One such formal notion of leakage resilience is the n-threshold-probing model proposed in the seminal work by…
Power Side-Channel (PSC) attacks exploit power consumption patterns to extract sensitive information, posing risks to cryptographic operations crucial for secure systems. Traditional countermeasures, such as masking, face challenges…
We propose a data-driven method for synthesizing a static analyzer to detect side-channel information leaks in cryptographic software. Compared to the conventional way of manually crafting such a static analyzer, which can be labor…
Hardware-software contracts are abstract specifications of a CPU's leakage behavior. They enable verifying the security of high-level programs against side-channel attacks without having to explicitly reason about the microarchitectural…
We explore and formalize the task of synthesizing programs over noisy data, i.e., data that may contain corrupted input-output examples. By formalizing the concept of a Noise Source, an Input Source, and a prior distribution over programs,…
Various studies among side-channel attacks have tried to extract information through leakages from electronic devices to reach the instruction flow of some appliances. However, previous methods highly depend on the resolution of traced…
We present IvySyn, the first fully-automated framework for discovering memory error vulnerabilities in Deep Learning (DL) frameworks. IvySyn leverages the statically-typed nature of native APIs in order to automatically perform type-aware…
Security critical software, e.g., OpenSSL, comes with numerous side-channel leakages left unpatched due to a lack of resources or experts. The situation will only worsen as the pace of code development accelerates, with developers relying…
Smart contracts are small but highly error-prone programs that implement agreements between multiple parties. We present a reactive synthesis approach for the automatic construction of smart contract state machines. Towards this end, we…
Smart contracts are self-executing programs that manage financial transactions on blockchain networks. Developers commonly rely on third-party code libraries to improve both efficiency and security. However, improper use of these libraries…
The problem of secure source coding with multiple terminals is extended by considering a remote source whose noisy measurements are the correlated random variables used for secure source reconstruction. The main additions to the problem…
The most scalable approaches to certifying neural network robustness depend on computing sound linear lower and upper bounds for the network's activation functions. Current approaches are limited in that the linear bounds must be…
Large language models (LLMs) have been widely adopted across various applications, leveraging customized system prompts for diverse tasks. Facing potential system prompt leakage risks, model developers have implemented strategies to prevent…
While cryptographic algorithms such as the ubiquitous Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are secure, *physical implementations* of these algorithms in hardware inevitably 'leak' sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. A particularly…
CPU cache is a limited but crucial storage component in modern processors, whereas the cache timing side-channel may inadvertently leak information through the physically measurable timing variance. Speculative execution, an essential…
This paper is concerned with synthesizing programs based on black-box oracles: we are interested in the case where there exists an executable implementation of a component or library, but its internal structure is unknown. We are provided…