Related papers: Hierarchical Decision-Making in Population Games

This paper considers a non-cooperative game in which competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel selfishly optimize their power allocation in order to improve their achievable rates. Previously, it was shown that a…

How individuals adapt their behavior in cultural evolution remains elusive. Theoretical studies have shown that the update rules chosen to model individual decision making can dramatically modify the evolutionary outcome of the population…

In the traditional game-theoretic set up, where agents select actions and experience corresponding utilities, an equilibrium is a configuration where no agent can improve their utility by unilaterally switching to a different action. In…

To our knowledge, the populations are generally assumed to be homogeneous in the traditional approach to evolutionary game dynamics. Here, we focus on the inhomogeneous populations. A simple model which can describe the inhomogeneity of the…

Existing theoretical models of evolution focus on the relative fitness advantages of different mutants in a population while the dynamic behavior of the population size is mostly left unconsidered. We here present a generic stochastic model…

We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general framework of acyclic games and game forms. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler (the order of…

We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…

We consider the problem of predicting human players' actions in repeated strategic interactions. Our goal is to predict the dynamic step-by-step behavior of individual players in previously unseen games. We study the ability of neural…

We investigate how the framework of mean-field games may be used to investigate strategic interactions in large heterogeneous populations. We consider strategic interactions in a population of players which may be partitioned into…

Asymmetric evolutionary games, such as the Ultimatum Game, provide keys to understanding the emergence of fairness in social species. Building on this framework, we explore the evolution of social value systems and the operational role that…

Classical game theory is a powerful framework to analyze the strategic interactions among rational players. However, in many real-life scenarios, players choose actions based on their inherent natural tendencies rather than deliberate…

Inspired by successful biological collective decision mechanisms such as honey bees searching for a new colony or the collective navigation of fish schools, we consider a mean field games (MFG)-like scenario where a large number of agents…

The field of Game Theory provides a useful mechanism for modeling many decision-making scenarios. In participating in these scenarios individuals and groups adopt particular strategies, which generally perform with varying levels of…

A general framework of evolutionary dynamics under heterogeneous populations is presented. The framework allows continuously many types of heterogeneous agents, heterogeneity both in payoff functions and in revision protocols and the entire…

We consider (random) strategic interactions in a large population consisting of a variety of players. A rational player chooses actions that maximize certain utility functions, while a behavioral player chooses actions based on preferences…

We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that locally…

We introduce a game where players selfishly choose a resource and endure a cost depending on the number of players choosing nearby resources. We model the influences among resources by a weighted graph, directed or not. These games are…

The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a…

The evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods game addresses the emergence of cooperation within groups of individuals. However, the Public Goods game on large populations of interconnected individuals has been usually modeled without any…

We provide a compositional coalgebraic semantics for strategic games. In our framework, like in the semantics of functional programming languages, coalgebras represent the observable behaviour of systems derived from the behaviour of the…