Related papers: Adversarial Decision-Making in Partially Observabl…
Trajectory planning involving multi-agent interactions has been a long-standing challenge in the field of robotics, primarily burdened by the inherent yet intricate interactions among agents. While game-theoretic methods are widely…
Defensive deception is a promising approach for cyber defense. Via defensive deception, the defender can anticipate attacker actions; it can mislead or lure attacker, or hide real resources. Although defensive deception is increasingly…
Inverse game theory is utilized to infer the cost functions of all players based on game outcomes. However, existing inverse game theory methods do not consider the learner as an active participant in the game, which could significantly…
Autonomous agents deployed in the real world need to be robust against adversarial attacks on sensory inputs. Robustifying agent policies requires anticipating the strongest attacks possible. We demonstrate that existing observation-space…
In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), self-interested agents attempt to establish equilibrium and achieve coordination depending on game structure. However, existing MARL approaches are mostly bound by the simultaneous actions of…
Stochastic multi-agent systems are a central modeling framework for autonomous controllers, communication protocols, and cyber-physical infrastructures. In many such systems, however, transition probabilities are only estimated from data…
While multi-agent LLM systems show strong capabilities in various domains, they are highly vulnerable to adversarial and low-performing agents. To resolve this issue, in this paper, we introduce a general and adversary-resistant multi-agent…
Human social behavior is structured by relationships. We form teams, groups, tribes, and alliances at all scales of human life. These structures guide multi-agent cooperation and competition, but when we observe others these underlying…
Asynchronous action coordination presents a pervasive challenge in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), which can be represented as a Stackelberg game (SG). However, the scalability of existing Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) methods based…
Strategic interaction in congested systems is commonly modelled using Stackelberg games, where competing leaders anticipate the behaviour of self-interested followers. A key limitation of existing models is that they typically ignore agents…
Privacy-preserving AI algorithms are widely adopted in various domains, but the lack of transparency might pose accountability issues. While auditing algorithms can address this issue, machine-based audit approaches are often costly and…
In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this…
When people play a repeated game they usually try to anticipate their opponents' moves based on past observations, and then decide what action to take next. Behavioural economics studies the mechanisms by which strategic decisions are taken…
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are stealthy attacks which make use of social engineering and deception to give adversaries insider access to networked systems. Against APTs, active defense technologies aim to create and exploit…
Trajectory guidance requires a leader robotic agent to assist a follower robotic agent to cooperatively reach the target destination. However, planning cooperation becomes difficult when the leader serves a family of different followers and…
In the problem of active sequential hypothesis testing (ASHT), a learner seeks to identify the true hypothesis from among a known set of hypotheses. The learner is given a set of actions and knows the random distribution of the outcome of…
Cybersecurity risk analysis plays an essential role in supporting organizations make effective decision about how to manage and control cybersecurity risk. Cybersecurity risk is a function of the interplay between the defender, i.e., the…
Batch reinforcement learning (RL) defines the task of learning from a fixed batch of data lacking exhaustive exploration. Worst-case optimality algorithms, which calibrate a value-function model class from logged experience and perform some…
Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential…
Recent superhuman results in games have largely been achieved in a variety of zero-sum settings, such as Go and Poker, in which agents need to compete against others. However, just like humans, real-world AI systems have to coordinate and…