Related papers: On Optimality of Private Information in Bayesian R…
As our ground transportation infrastructure modernizes, the large amount of data being measured, transmitted, and stored motivates an analysis of the privacy aspect of these emerging cyber-physical technologies. In this paper, we consider…
In this paper, we consider the problem of scheduling real-time traffic in wireless networks under a conflict-graph interference model and single-hop traffic. The objective is to guarantee that at least a certain fraction of packets of each…
We study routing games in which travelers optimize over routes that are remembered or surfaced, rather than over a fixed exogenous action set. The paper develops a tractable design theory for endogenous recall and then connects it back to…
We study a network design problem (NDP) where the planner aims at selecting the optimal single-link intervention on a transportation network to minimize the travel time under Wardrop equilibrium flows. Our first result is that, if the delay…
We consider two optimization problems in which a planner aims to influence the average transient opinion in the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics on a network by intervening on the agents' innate opinions. Solving these problems requires full…
Increasingly large trip demands have strained urban transportation capacity, which consequently leads to traffic congestion and rapid growth of greenhouse gas emissions. In this work, we focus on achieving sustainable transportation by…
An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent…
Recent years have witnessed a growing number of attack vectors against increasingly interconnected traffic networks. Informational attacks have emerged as the prominent ones that aim to poison traffic data, misguide users, and manipulate…
We consider a model of Bayesian observational learning in which a sequence of agents receives a private signal about an underlying binary state of the world. Each agent makes a decision based on its own signal and its observations of…
The inefficiency of selfish routing in congested networks is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory, often captured by the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio between the social cost of decentralized decisions and that of a centrally…
Global infrastructure robustness and local transport efficiency are critical requirements for transportation networks. However, since passengers often travel greedily to maximize their own benefit and trigger traffic jams, overall…
Structure learning of Bayesian networks is an important problem that arises in numerous machine learning applications. In this work, we present a novel approach for learning the structure of Bayesian networks using the solution of an…
We consider the problem of how strategic users with asymmetric information can learn an underlying time varying state in a user-recommendation system. Users who observe private signals about the state, sequentially make a decision about…
We study information design settings where the designer controls information about a state, and there are multiple agents interacting in a game who are privately informed about their types. Each agent's utility depends on all agents' types…
The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal…
We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Previous works assume that the sender has…
In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…
This paper examines the optimal design of information sharing in organizations. Organizational performance depends on agents adapting to uncertain external environments while coordinating their actions, where coordination incentives and…
The Internet is a loose amalgamation of independent service providers acting in their own self-interest. We examine the implications of this economic reality on peering relationships. Specifically, we consider how the incentives of the…
We consider the optimal packet scheduling problem in a single-user energy harvesting wireless communication system. In this system, both the data packets and the harvested energy are modeled to arrive at the source node randomly. Our goal…