Related papers: Public Persuasion with Endogenous Fact-Checking
Two long-lived senders play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we unearth a folk theorem: if they are sufficiently patient,…
In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has been devoted to settings in which sender and receivers…
In this paper we investigate the potential for persuasion arising from the quantum indeterminacy of a decision-maker's beliefs, a feature that has been proposed as a formal expression of well-known cognitive limitations. We focus on a…
I describe a Bayesian persuasion problem where Receiver has a private type representing a cutoff for choosing Sender's preferred action, and Sender has maxmin preferences over all Receiver type distributions with known mean and bounds. This…
Persuasion is the process of changing an agent's belief distribution from a given (or estimated) prior to a desired posterior. A common assumption in the acceptance of information or misinformation as fact is that the (mis)information must…
Bayesian Persuasion is proposed as a tool for social media platforms to combat the spread of misinformation. Since platforms can use machine learning to predict the popularity and misinformation features of to-be-shared posts, and users are…
We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information;…
An analyst observes the frequency with which an agent takes actions, but not the frequency with which she takes actions conditional on a payoff relevant state. In this setting, we ask when the analyst can rationalize the agent's choices as…
In recent studies of political decision-making, apparently anomalous behavior has been observed on the part of voters, in which negative information about a candidate strengthens, rather than weakens, a prior positive opinion about the…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
Prominent opinion formation models such as the one by Friedkin and Johnsen (FJ) concentrate on the effects of peer pressure on public opinions. In practice, opinion formation is also based on information about the state of the world and…
The prevalence of state-sponsored propaganda on the Internet has become a cause for concern in the recent years. While much effort has been made to identify state-sponsored Internet propaganda, the problem remains far from being solved…
How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by…
Presidential debates are viewed as providing an important public good by revealing information on candidates to voters. We consider an endogenous model of presidential debates in which an incumbent and a challenger (who is privately…
I propose a cheap-talk model in which the sender can use private messages and only cares about persuading a subset of her audience. For example, a candidate only needs to persuade a majority of the electorate in order to win an election. I…
We propose a collective opinion formation model with a so-called confirmation bias. The confirmation bias is a psychological effect with which, in the context of opinion formation, an individual in favor of an opinion is prone to…
Influence campaigns in online social networks are often run by organizations, political parties, and nation states to influence large audiences. These campaigns are employed through the use of agents in the network that share persuasive…
We revisit the distributed hypothesis testing (or hypothesis testing with communication constraints) problem from the viewpoint of privacy. Instead of observing the raw data directly, the transmitter observes a sanitized or randomized…
Motivated reasoning posits that people distort how they process information in the direction of beliefs they find attractive. This paper creates a novel experimental design to identify motivated reasoning from Bayesian updating when people…
The spread of disinformation (maliciously spread false information) in online social networks has become an important problem in today's society. Disinformation's spread is facilitated by the fact that individuals often accept false…