Related papers: Strategyproof Randomized Social Choice for Restric…
A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal utility functions over the alternatives, but voting rules have…
This paper introduces a strategic planning tool for master-planned communities designed specifically to quantify residents' subjective preferences about large investments in amenities and infrastructure projects. Drawing on data obtained…
This paper provides a general framework to explore the possibility of agenda manipulation-proof and proper consensus-based preference aggregation rules, so powerfully called in doubt by a disputable if widely shared understanding of Arrow's…
We define and study obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition of the set of agents. It encompasses strategy-proofness as a special case when the partition is the coarsest one and obvious strategy-proofness when the partition is…
We consider a sequential blocked matching (SBM) model where strategic agents repeatedly report ordinal preferences over a set of services to a central planner. The planner's goal is to elicit agents' true preferences and design a policy…
In [ABM07], Abdulla et al. introduced the concept of decisiveness, an interesting tool for lifting good properties of finite Markov chains to denumerable ones. Later, this concept was extended to more general stochastic transition systems…
We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to…
We introduce a utility-driven bounded-confidence model of opinion dynamics in which opinions associated with higher utility exert stronger social influence. In the regime where all agents belong to a single opinion cluster, we derive a…
In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design, \citet{NR99} studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on unrelated machines aiming to minimize the makespan. They provided…
In 1950 Arrow famously showed that there is no social welfare function satisfying four basic conditions. In 1976, on the other hand, Gibbard and Sonnenschein showed that there does exist a unique probabilistic social welfare method that…
Two main procedures characterize the way in which social actors evaluate the qualities of the options in decision-making processes: they either seek to evaluate their intrinsic qualities (individual learners), or they rely on the opinion of…
We propose an axiomatic approach which economically underpins the representation of dynamic preferences in terms of a stochastic utility function, sensitive to the information available to the decision maker. Our construction is iterative…
I study dynamic random utility with finite choice sets and exogenous total menu variation, which I refer to as stochastic utility (SU). First, I characterize SU when each choice set has three elements. Next, I prove several mathematical…
Humans have come to rely on machines for reducing excessive information to manageable representations. But this reliance can be abused -- strategic machines might craft representations that manipulate their users. How can a user make good…
We study social choice rules under the utilitarian distortion framework, with an additional metric assumption on the agents' costs over the alternatives. In this approach, these costs are given by an underlying metric on the set of all…
We introduce stochastic decision Petri nets (SDPNs), which are a form of stochastic Petri nets equipped with rewards and a control mechanism via the deactivation of controllable transitions. Such nets can be translated into Markov decision…
In many security and healthcare systems, the detection and diagnosis systems use a sequence of sensors/tests. Each test outputs a prediction of the latent state and carries an inherent cost. However, the correctness of the predictions…
Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…
Two prominent objectives in social choice are utilitarian - maximizing the sum of agents' utilities, and leximin - maximizing the smallest agent's utility, then the second-smallest, etc. Utilitarianism is typically computationally easier to…
In many real-world scenarios, the utility of a user is derived from the single execution of a policy. In this case, to apply multi-objective reinforcement learning, the expected utility of the returns must be optimised. Various scenarios…