Related papers: Algorithms for Stable Roommate with Externalities
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
Reciprocal recommender systems (RRSs) are crucial in online two-sided matching platforms, such as online job or dating markets, as they need to consider the preferences of both sides of the match. The concentration of recommendations to a…
The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S) comprises three sets of agents, namely students, projects and lecturers, where students have preferences over projects and lecturers have preferences…
Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and…
We study four NP-hard optimal seat arrangement problems [Bodlaender et al., 2020a], which each have as input a set of n agents, where each agent has cardinal preferences over other agents, and an n-vertex undirected graph (called seat…
The standard two-sided and one-sided matching problems, and the closely related school choice problem, have been widely studied from an axiomatic viewpoint. A small number of algorithms dominate the literature. For two-sided matching, the…
We continue and extend previous work on the parameterized complexity analysis of the NP-hard Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists problem, thereby strengthening earlier results both on the side of parameterized hardness as well…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
The Assignment problem is a fundamental and well-studied problem in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In the Assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a set of items,…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
In the real world, people/entities usually find matches independently and autonomously, such as finding jobs, partners, roommates, etc. It is possible that this search for matches starts with no initial knowledge of the environment. We…
In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However,…
In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other…
Mechanism design on social networks is a hot research direction recently, and we have seen many interesting results in auctions and matching. Compared to the traditional settings, the new goal of the network settings is that we need to…
In real-world settings of the Deferred Acceptance stable matching algorithm, such as the American medical residency match (NRMP), school choice programs, and various national university entrance systems, candidates need to decide which…
We consider the stable assignment problem on a graph with nonnegative real capacities on the edges and quotas on the vertices, in which the preferences of agents are given via diversifying choice functions. We prove that for any input of…
The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairness in settings with preferences on both sides, that is,…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
In the random assignment problem, objects are randomly assigned to agents keeping in view the agents' preferences over objects. A random assignment specifies the probability of an agent getting an object. We examine the structural and…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…