Related papers: Algorithms for Stable Roommate with Externalities
This paper aims to provide insight into stability of collaboration choices in P2P networks. We study networks where exchanges between nodes are driven by the desire to receive the best service available. This is the case for most existing…
We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where monetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of justified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties…
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
Inspired by real-world applications such as the assignment of pupils to schools or the allocation of social housing, the one-sided matching problem studies how a set of agents can be assigned to a set of objects when the agents have…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
We study the problem of repeated two-sided matching with uncertain preferences (two-sided bandits), and no explicit communication between agents. Recent work has developed algorithms that converge to stable matchings when one side (the…
In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…
We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists SRI that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, EGAL d-SRI,…
The deferred acceptance algorithm is an elegant solution to the stable matching problem that guarantees optimality and truthfulness for one side of the market. Despite these desirable guarantees, it is susceptible to strategic misreporting…
We focus on the problem of placing two facilities along a linear space to serve a group of agents. Each agent is committed to minimizing the distance between her location and the closest facility. A mechanism is an algorithm that maps the…
Designing two-sided matching mechanisms is challenging when practical demands for matching outcomes are difficult to formalize and the designed mechanism must satisfy theoretical conditions. To address this, prior work has proposed a…
In a multiple partners matching problem the agents can have multiple partners up to their capacities. In this paper we consider both the two-sided many-to-many stable matching problem and the one-sided stable fixtures problem under…
One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-studied randomized mechanisms in multiagent settings are the…