Related papers: Defending a City from Multi-Drone Attacks: A Seque…

This paper introduces decentralized control concepts for drones using differential game theory. The approach optimizes the behavior of an ego drone, assuming the anticipated behavior of the opponent drones using a receding horizon approach.…

This paper focuses on the performance of equalizer zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in discounted repeated Stackerberg asymmetric games. In the leader-follower adversarial scenario, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) deriving from the…

The current paper studies a protective mission to defend a domain called the safe zone from a rogue drone invasion. We consider a one attacker and one defender drone scenario where only a noisy observation of the attacker at every time step…

Swarms of drones are being more and more used in many practical scenarios, such as surveillance, environmental monitoring, search and rescue in hardly-accessible areas, etc.. While a single drone can be guided by a human operator, the…

This paper addresses a critical aerial defense challenge in contested airspace, involving three autonomous aerial vehicles -- a hostile drone (the pursuer), a high-value drone (the evader), and a protective drone (the defender). We present…

Federated learning (FL) is susceptible to a range of security threats. Although various defense mechanisms have been proposed, they are typically non-adaptive and tailored to specific types of attacks, leaving them insufficient in the face…

In this paper, we consider a new network security game wherein an attacker and a defender are battling over "multiple" targets. This type of game is appropriate to model many current network security conflicts such as Internet phishing,…

Similar to a strategic interaction between rational and intelligent agents, cryptography problems can be examined through the prism of game theory. In this setting, the agent aiming to protect a message is called the defender, while the one…

In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this…

This research contributes to the security design of an advanced smart drone swarm network based on a variant of the Blockchain Governance Game (BGG), which is the theoretical game model to predict the moments of security actions before…

We explored the Patrol Security Game (PSG), a robotic patrolling problem modeled as an extensive-form Stackelberg game, where the attacker determines the timing, location, and duration of their attack. Our objective is to devise a…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…

In this paper, we present a dual-layer online optimization strategy for defender robots operating in multiplayer reach-avoid games within general convex environments. Our goal is to intercept as many attacker robots as possible without…

To be successful in multi-player drone racing, a player must not only follow the race track in an optimal way, but also compete with other drones through strategic blocking, faking, and opportunistic passing while avoiding collisions. Since…

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…

This paper studies a stochastic robotic surveillance problem where a mobile robot moves randomly on a graph to capture a potential intruder that strategically attacks a location on the graph. The intruder is assumed to be omniscient: it…

In shared autonomy, a critical tension arises when an automated assistant must choose between obeying a human's instruction and deliberately overriding it to prevent harm. This safety-critical behavior is known as intelligent disobedience.…

We formulate a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of a power system. The attacker attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power system covertly and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid is…

The perimeter defense game has received interest in recent years as a variant of the pursuit-evasion game. A number of previous works have solved this game to obtain the optimal strategies for defender and intruder, but the derived theory…

We investigate a co-design problem, encompassing simultaneous design of system infrastructure and control, through a game-theoretical framework. To this end, we propose the co-design problem as a two-layer hierarchical strategic…