Related papers: Anonymous voting in a heterogeneous society
We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…
Let V be a finite society whose members express weak orderings (hence also indifference, possibly) about two alternatives. We show a simple representation formula that is valid for all, and only, anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social…
We study the problem of designing voting rules that take as input the ordinal preferences of $n$ agents over a set of $m$ alternatives and output a single alternative, aiming to optimize the overall happiness of the agents. The input to the…
This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…
We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming…
We consider the egalitarian welfare aspects of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal…
We consider the fundamental mechanism design problem of approximate social welfare maximization under general cardinal preferences on a finite number of alternatives and without money. The well-known range voting scheme can be thought of as…
A researcher observes a finite sequence of choices made by multiple agents in a binary-state environment. Agents maximize expected utilities that depend on their chosen alternative and the unknown underlying state. Agents learn about the…
Decision making under uncertainty is a key component of many AI settings, and in particular of voting scenarios where strategic agents are trying to reach a joint decision. The common approach to handle uncertainty is by maximizing expected…
We analyze Assessment Voting, a new two-round voting procedure that can be applied to binary decisions in democratic societies. In the first round, a randomly-selected number of citizens cast their vote on one of the two alternatives at…
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…
In social choice theory, anonymity (all agents being treated equally) and neutrality (all alternatives being treated equally) are widely regarded as ``minimal demands'' and ``uncontroversial'' axioms of equity and fairness. However, the ANR…
We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information;…
The guarantee of an anonymous mechanism is the worst case welfare an agent can secure against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? We address the worst case design…
For a binary choice problem, the spatial coordination of decisions in an agent community is investigated both analytically and by means of stochastic computer simulations. The individual decisions are based on different local information…
Social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment is analyzed for a society composed of two cohesive groups of similar size. Within the model of random walks determined by voting, explicit formulas are derived for the capital…
Consider the the problem of maximizing the relative social welfare of truthful single-winner voting schemes with cardinal preferences compared to the classical range voting scheme. The range voting scheme is a simple and straightforward…
Iterative voting is a natural model of repeated strategic decision-making in social choice theory when agents have the opportunity to update their votes prior to finalizing the group decision. Prior work has analyzed the efficacy of…
When a company undergoes a merger or transfers its ownership, the existing governing body has an opinion on which buyer should take over as the new owner. Similar situations occur while assigning the host of big sports tournaments, like the…
Cooperation is fundamental to the evolution of human society. We regularly observe cooperative behaviour in everyday life and in controlled experiments with anonymous people, even though standard economic models predict that they should…