Related papers: Membership Inference Attacks with False Discovery …
Membership inference attacks aim to infer whether a data record has been used to train a target model by observing its predictions. In sensitive domains such as healthcare, this can constitute a severe privacy violation. In this work we…
Membership inference (MI) attack is currently the most popular test for measuring privacy leakage in machine learning models. Given a machine learning model, a data point and some auxiliary information, the goal of an MI attack is to…
Machine learning models are susceptible to membership inference attacks (MIAs), which aim to infer whether a sample is in the training set. Existing work utilizes gradient ascent to enlarge the loss variance of training data, alleviating…
Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a promising privacy-aware paradigm that allows multiple clients to jointly train a model without sharing their private data. Recently, many studies have shown that FL is vulnerable to membership…
Recent work shows membership inference attacks (MIAs) on large language models (LLMs) produce inconclusive results, partly due to difficulties in creating non-member datasets without temporal shifts. While researchers have turned to…
OpenLVLM-MIA is a new benchmark that highlights fundamental challenges in evaluating membership inference attacks (MIA) against large vision-language models (LVLMs). While prior work has reported high attack success rates, our analysis…
Over the last few years, federated learning (FL) has emerged as a prominent method in machine learning, emphasizing privacy preservation by allowing multiple clients to collaboratively build a model while keeping their training data…
Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) act as a crucial auditing tool for the opaque training data of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, existing techniques predominantly rely on inaccessible model internals (e.g., logits) or suffer from…
Differential Privacy (DP) is the de facto standard for reasoning about the privacy guarantees of a training algorithm. Despite the empirical observation that DP reduces the vulnerability of models to existing membership inference (MI)…
The rise of generative image models leads to privacy concerns when it comes to the huge datasets used to train such models. This paper investigates the possibility of inferring if a set of face images was used for fine-tuning a Latent…
This paper presents how to leak private information from a wireless signal classifier by launching an over-the-air membership inference attack (MIA). As machine learning (ML) algorithms are used to process wireless signals to make decisions…
Training a machine learning model with data following a meaningful order, i.e., from easy to hard, has been proven to be effective in accelerating the training process and achieving better model performance. The key enabling technique is…
Generative AI systems are quickly improving, now able to produce believable output in several modalities including images, text, and audio. However, this fast development has prompted increased scrutiny concerning user privacy and the use…
How much does a machine learning algorithm leak about its training data, and why? Membership inference attacks are used as an auditing tool to quantify this leakage. In this paper, we present a comprehensive \textit{hypothesis testing…
Membership inference (MI) attacks try to determine if a data sample was used to train a machine learning model. For foundation models trained on unknown Web data, MI attacks are often used to detect copyrighted training materials, measure…
The success of deep neural networks has driven numerous research studies and applications from Euclidean to non-Euclidean data. However, there are increasing concerns about privacy leakage, as these networks rely on processing private data.…
Model Inversion Attacks (MIAs) pose a significant threat to data privacy by reconstructing sensitive training samples from the knowledge embedded in trained machine learning models. Despite recent progress in enhancing the effectiveness of…
Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to memorizing training data, which poses serious privacy risks. Two of the most prominent concerns are training data extraction and Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs). Prior research has shown that…
Foundation-style ECG encoders pretrained with self-supervised learning are increasingly reused across tasks, institutions, and deployment contexts, often through model-as-a-service interfaces that expose scalar scores or latent…
In this paper we develop state-of-the-art privacy attacks against Large Language Models (LLMs), where an adversary with some access to the model tries to learn something about the underlying training data. Our headline results are new…