Related papers: Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto …
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive utilities. It is desirable for the allocation to be both fair and efficient, which we formalize through the notions of envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality.…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time…
We study failure rate monotonicity and generalized convex transform stochastic ordering properties of random variables, with a concern on applications. We are especially interested in the effect of a tail weight iteration procedure to…
The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider the problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with…
We study the problem of designing multiwinner voting rules that are candidate monotone and proportional. We show that the set of committees satisfying the proportionality axiom of proportionality for solid coalitions is candidate monotone.…
Designing fair algorithmic decision systems requires balancing model performance with fairness toward affected individuals: More fairness might require sacrificing some performance and vice versa, yet the space of possible trade-offs is…
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…
The paper considers the problem of finding the number of dominant voters in two-level voting procedures. At the first stage, voting is conducted among local groups of voters, and at the second stage, the results are aggregated to form a…
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…
A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…
In this paper, we focus on efficient risk-sharing rules for the concave dominance order. For a univariate risk, it follows from a comonotone dominance principle, due to Landsberger and Meilijson [25], that efficiency is characterized by a…
We study implementation of a social choice correspondence in the case of two players who have von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities over a finite set of social alternatives, and the mechanism is allowed to output lotteries. Our main positive…
Inspired by applications in sports where the skill of players or teams competing against each other varies over time, we propose a probabilistic model of pairwise-comparison outcomes that can capture a wide range of time dynamics. We…
Pareto optimization via evolutionary multi-objective algorithms has been shown to efficiently solve constrained monotone submodular functions. Traditionally when solving multiple problems, the algorithm is run for each problem separately.…
A fundamental resource allocation setting is the random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects that are then randomly allocated to the agents. In 2001, Bogomolnaia and Moulin presented the probabilistic serial…
We prove the following results for task allocation of indivisible resources: - The problem of finding a leximin-maximal resource allocation is in P if the agents have max-utility functions and atomic demands. - Deciding whether a resource…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and chores under category constraints. Specifically, there are $n$ agents and $m$ indivisible items which are partitioned into categories with associated capacities. An allocation…
We consider the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible items (goods or bads) under capacity constraints. In this setting, we are given a set of categorized items. Each category has a capacity constraint (the same for all…
We study the problem of fairly allocating either a set of indivisible goods or a set of mixed divisible and indivisible goods (i.e., mixed goods) to agents with additive utilities, taking the best-of-both-worlds perspective of guaranteeing…