Related papers: Screening with damages and ordeals
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…
We consider the task of assigning indivisible goods to a set of agents in a fair manner. Our notion of fairness is Nash social welfare, i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities of the agents. Each good comes in…
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. When the utilities can be negative, the existence and complexity of an allocation that satisfies Pareto optimality and proportionality up to one item (PROP1) is an…
We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to efficiently allocate n items to n agents that each have a complete, private preference list and a unit demand over the items. Our focus is on allocation mechanisms…
Searching for objects amongst clutter is a key ability of visual systems. Speed and accuracy are often crucial: how can the visual system trade off these competing quantities for optimal performance in different tasks? How does the…
The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness…
The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider the problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with…
The cost-effectiveness of policies providing subsidized goods is often compromised by limited use of the goods provided. Through a randomized trial, we test two approaches to improve the cost-effectiveness of a program distributing free…
Result ranking often affects consumer satisfaction as well as the amount of exposure each item receives in the ranking services. Myopically maximizing customer satisfaction by ranking items only according to relevance will lead to unfair…
One of the important yet insufficiently studied subjects in fair allocation is the externality effect among agents. For a resource allocation problem, externalities imply that a bundle allocated to an agent may affect the utilities of other…
Assortment optimization concerns the problem of selling items with fixed prices to a buyer who will purchase at most one. Typically, retailers select a subset of items, corresponding to an "assortment" of brands to carry, and make each…
We consider the fundamental problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among strategic agents with additive valuation functions. It is well known that, in the absence of monetary transfers, Pareto efficient and truthful rules are…
I study multidimensional sequential screening. A monopolist contracts with a buyer who privately observes information about the distribution of their eventual valuations for multiple goods. After initial private information is reported and…
We consider the egalitarian welfare aspects of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal…
Methods for learning optimal policies use causal machine learning models to create human-interpretable rules for making choices around the allocation of different policy interventions. However, in realistic policy-making contexts,…
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous and indivisible goods among strategic agents, with preferences over subsets of goods, when there is no medium of exchange. This model captures the well studied problem of fair allocation…
A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. The seller uses information to price discriminate the buyer. A designer offers a mechanism that provides the seller with additional information…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to multiple agents. Recent work [Bouveret and Lang, 2011] focused on allocating goods in a sequential way, and studied what is the "best" sequence of agents to pick objects based…
We study optimal rating design under moral hazard and strategic manipulation. An intermediary observes a noisy indicator of effort and commits to a rating policy that shapes market beliefs and pay. We characterize optimal ratings via…
We consider a market setting of agents with additive valuations over heterogeneous divisible resources. Agents are assigned a budget of tokens (possibly unequal budgets) they can use to obtain resources; leftover tokens are worthless. We…