Related papers: Thermal-Aware 3D Design for Side-Channel Informati…
Modern processors dynamically control their operating frequency to optimize resource utilization, maximize energy savings, and conform to system-defined constraints. If, during the execution of a software workload, the running average of…
By combining Three Dimensional Integrated Circuits with the Network-on-Chip infrastructure to obtain 3D Networks-on-Chip (3D-NoCs), the new on-chip communication paradigm brings several advantages on lower power, smaller footprint and lower…
In this work, we identify a set of side-channels in our Confidential Federated Compute platform that a hypothetical insider could exploit to circumvent differential privacy (DP) guarantees. We show how DP can mitigate two of the…
Cybersecurity continues to be a difficult issue for society especially as the number of networked systems grows. Techniques to protect these systems range from rules-based to artificial intelligence-based intrusion detection systems and…
Different from the traditional software vulnerability, the microarchitecture side channel has three characteristics: extensive influence, potent threat, and tough defense. The main reason for the micro-architecture side channel is resource…
Side-channel attacks have become prominent attack surfaces in cyberspace. Attackers use the side information generated by the system while performing a task. Among the various side-channel attacks, cache side-channel attacks are leading as…
The threats of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures have been widely researched. Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the unavoidable influence of computation or storage on current consumption or voltage drop on a…
We present a kernel-level infrastructure that allows system-wide detection of malicious applications attempting to exploit cache-based side-channel attacks to break the process confinement enforced by standard operating systems. This…
Industrial Control Systems are under increased scrutiny. Their security is historically sub-par, and although measures are being taken by the manufacturers to remedy this, the large installed base of legacy systems cannot easily be updated…
While side-channel leakage is traditionally evaluated from a fabricated chip, it is more time-efficient and cost-effective to do so during the design phase of the chip. We present a methodology to rank the gates of a design according to…
Side-channel attacks are a security exploit that take advantage of information leakage. They use measurement and analysis of physical parameters to reverse engineer and extract secrets from a system. Power analysis attacks in particular,…
Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested by…
To protect cryptographic implementations from side-channel vulnerabilities, developers must adopt constant-time programming practices. As these can be error-prone, many side-channel detection tools have been proposed. Despite this, such…
The power consumption of a microprocessor is a huge channel for information leakage. While the most popular exploitation of this channel is to recover cryptographic keys from embedded devices, other applications such as mobile app…
The confidentiality of trained AI models on edge devices is at risk from side-channel attacks exploiting power and electromagnetic emissions. This paper proposes a novel training methodology to enhance resilience against such threats by…
Physical side-channel attacks can compromise the security of integrated circuits. Most physical side-channel attacks (e.g., power or electromagnetic) exploit the dynamic behavior of a chip, typically manifesting as changes in current…
To meet the ever-growing need for performance in silicon devices, SoC providers have been increasingly relying on software-hardware cooperation. By controlling hardware resources such as power or clock management from the software,…
Side-channel attacks on memory (SCAM) exploit unintended data leaks from memory subsystems to infer sensitive information, posing significant threats to system security. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities in memory access patterns, cache…
Side-channel attacks consist of retrieving internal data from a victim system by analyzing its leakage, which usually requires proximity to the victim in the range of a few millimetres. Screaming channels are EM side channels transmitted at…
3D die stacking and 2.5D interposer design are promising technologies to improve integration density, performance and cost. Current approaches face serious issues in dealing with emerging security challenges such as side channel attacks,…