Related papers: Robust Contract with Career Concerns
This study investigates the reaction of workers to employer-sponsored general training that provides skills useful not only in the incumbent employer but also in other firms in the industry. While previous research has focused primarily on…
A principal contracts with an agent who sequentially searches over projects to generate a prize. The principal initially knows only one of the agent's available projects and evaluates a contract by its worst-case performance. We…
Professional networks -- the social networks among people in a given line of work -- can serve as a conduit for job prospects and other opportunities. Here we propose a model for the formation of such networks and the transfer of…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
Despite the importance of this variable in the macroeconomic context, current research on job insecurity remains mainly confined to its non-systemic dimension. The research aim of this paper is to identify the short-run and long-run…
The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings.…
In a framework close to the one developed by Holmstr\"om and Milgrom [44], we study the optimal contracting scheme between a Principal and several Agents. Each hired Agent is in charge of one project, and can make efforts towards managing…
Linear contracts are ubiquitous in practice, yet optimal contract theory often prescribes complex, nonlinear structures. We provide a distributional robustness justification for linear contracts. We study a principal-agent problem where the…
In many professons employees are rewarded according to their relative performance. Corresponding economy can be modeled by taking $N$ independent agents who gain from the market with a rate which depends on their current gain. We argue that…
Liberalized electricity markets often include resource adequacy mechanisms that require consumers to contract with generation resources well in advance of real-time operations. While administratively defined mechanisms have most commonly…
We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…
Miscalibrated beliefs are widely viewed as compromising the quality of employees' decisions. Why, then, might an organization prefer to hire an individual known to be overconfident? This paper develops a theory of organizational demand for…
We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes.…
I study how organisations choose selection procedures in a competitive environment. Two firms compete to hire candidates of unknown productivity from a common pool. Firms simultaneously post a selection procedure which consists of a test…
A platform charges a producer for disclosing quality evidence to consumers before trade. It aims to maximize its revenue guarantee across potentially multiple equilibria which arise from the interdependence of producer purchase decisions…
We study misspecified Bayesian learning in principal-agent relationships, where an agent is assessed by an evaluator and rewarded by the market. The agent's outcome depends on their innate ability, costly effort -- whose effectiveness is…
The excessive compensation packages of CEOs of U.S. corporations in recent years have brought to the foreground the issue of fairness in economics. The conventional wisdom is that the free market for labor, which determines the pay…
We study a multi-agent contracting problem where agents exert costly effort to achieve individually observable binary outcomes. While the principal can theoretically extract the full social welfare using a discriminatory contract that…
In many markets, like electricity or cloud computing markets, providers incur large costs for keeping sufficient capacity in reserve to accommodate demand fluctuations of a mostly fixed user base. These costs are significantly affected by…