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We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
While the existence of a stable matching for the stable roommates problem possibly with incomplete preference lists (SRI) can be decided in polynomial time, SRI problems with some fairness criteria are intractable. Egalitarian SRI that…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the well-known stable matching problem. Teo and Sethuraman proved that, for each instance of the stable roommates problem in a complete graph, there exists a linear inequality…
In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…
Motivated by the increasing interest in the explicit representation and handling of various "preference" structures arising in modern digital economy, this work introduces a new class of "one-to-many stable-matching" problems where a set of…
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change over time. Consequently, an initially stable matching may…
In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called "roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the stable matching problem in a bipartite graph. In this paper, we consider the stable roommates problem with ties. In particular, we focus on strong stability, which is one of the…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this by proposing "incrementalized versions" of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for…
We consider stable and popular matching problems in arbitrary graphs, which are referred to as stable roommates instances. We extend the 3/2-approximation algorithm for the maximum size weakly stable matching problem to the roommates case,…
This paper has two objectives. One is to give a linear time algorithm that solves the stable roommates problem (i.e., obtains one stable matching) using the stable marriage problem. The idea is that a stable matching of a roommate instance…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
In stable matching, one must find a matching between two sets of agents, commonly men and women, or job applicants and job positions. Each agent has a preference ordering over who they want to be matched with. Moreover a matching is said to…
We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists SRI that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, EGAL d-SRI,…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…