Related papers: Discrete-Time LQ Stochastic Two Person Nonzero Sum…
This paper explores distributed aggregative games in multi-agent systems. Current methods for finding distributed Nash equilibrium require players to send original messages to their neighbors, leading to communication burden and privacy…
Drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, we present a novel framework, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in resource selection games (i.e., asymmetric singleton congestion games) with nonatomic…
In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain…
We study a general formulation of the classical two-player Dynkin game in a discrete time Markovian setting. We identify an appropriate class of mixed strategies -- \textit{Markovian randomized stopping times} -- in which players stop at…
The solvability of equilibrium Riccati equations (EREs) plays a central role in the study of time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problems, because it paves the way to constructing a closed-loop equilibrium…
We consider a symmetric $n$-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with controlled jumps and mean-field type interaction among the players. Each player minimizes some expected cost by affecting the drift as well as the jump part of…
We prove that differential Nash equilibria are generic amongst local Nash equilibria in continuous zero-sum games. That is, there exists an open-dense subset of zero-sum games for which local Nash equilibria are non-degenerate differential…
For the characterization of Feedback Nash Equilibria (FNE) in linear quadratic games, this paper provides a detailed analysis of the discrete-time discounted coupled best-response equations for the scalar two-player setting, together with a…
Finite-horizon linear quadratic (LQ) games admit a unique Nash equilibrium, while infinite-horizon settings may have multiple. We clarify the relationship between these two cases by interpreting the finite-horizon equilibrium as a nonlinear…
Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…
We present necessary conditions for linear noncooperative N-player delta dynamic games on a generic time scale. Necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash-equilibrium and for a memoryless perfect state Nash-equilibrium are proved.
We give a simple proof of the well-known result that the marginal strategies of a coarse correlated equilibrium form a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. A corollary of this fact is that no-external-regret learning algorithms…
Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…
$ $This paper addresses the inverse problem for Linear-Quadratic (LQ) nonzero-sum $N$-player differential games, where the goal is to learn parameters of an unknown cost function for the game, called observed, given the demonstrated…
This paper investigates the problem of computing the equilibrium of competitive games, which is often modeled as a constrained saddle-point optimization problem with probability simplex constraints. Despite recent efforts in understanding…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic (LQ) leader-follower differential game with mixed deterministic and stochastic controls. In the game, the follower is a random controller which means that the follower can choose adapted…
Nash equilibria are crucial for understanding game behavior and systems in economics, physics, biology, and computer science. A significant application arises from the connection between Nash equilibria and optimization problems . However,…
We explore the use of policy approximations to reduce the computational cost of learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games. We propose a new Q-learning type algorithm that uses a sequence of entropy-regularized soft policies to…