Related papers: The Root of Revenue Continuity
We study the stability of entropically regularized optimal transport with respect to the marginals. Lipschitz continuity of the value and H\"older continuity of the optimal coupling in $p$-Wasserstein distance are obtained under general…
We study the problem of selling $n$ heterogeneous items to a single buyer, whose values for different items are dependent. Under arbitrary dependence, Hart and Nisan show that no simple mechanism can achieve a non-negligible fraction of the…
We consider the fundamental scenario where a single item is to be sold to one of two agents. Both agents draw their valuation for the item from the same probability distribution. However, only one of them submits a bid to the mechanism. The…
Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer whose values for the items are arbitrarily correlated. It was previously shown that, in such settings, distributions exist for which the seller's optimal…
This paper expands the notion of robust profit opportunities in financial markets to incorporate distributional uncertainty using Wasserstein distance as the ambiguity measure. Financial markets with risky and risk-free assets are…
We consider an economic environment where a seller wants to sell an indivisible unit of good to a buyer. We show that revenue from any strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism defined on closed intervals of rich single crossing…
We extend the celebrated Stone's theorem to the framework of distributional regression. More precisely, we prove that weighted empirical distribution with local probability weights satisfying the conditions of Stone's theorem provide…
The valuation process that economic agents undergo for investments with uncertain payoff typically depends on their statistical views on possible future outcomes, their attitudes toward risk, and, of course, the payoff structure itself.…
The assortment problem in revenue management is the problem of deciding which subset of products to offer to consumers in order to maximise revenue. A simple and natural strategy is to select the best assortment out of all those that are…
This paper provides a simple procedure to fit generative networks to target distributions, with the goal of a small Wasserstein distance (or other optimal transport costs). The approach is based on two principles: (a) if the source…
A special case of Myerson's classic result describes the revenue-optimal equilibrium when a seller offers a single item to a buyer. We study a repeated sales extension of this model: a seller offers to sell a single fresh copy of an item to…
An influential theory of increasing returns has been proposed by the economist W. B. Arthur in the '80s to explain the lock-in phenomenon between two competing commercial products. In the most simplified situation there are two competing…
In the design and analysis of revenue-maximizing auctions, auction performance is typically measured with respect to a prior distribution over inputs. The most obvious source for such a distribution is past data. The goal is to understand…
We study the problem of minimizing the Wasserstein distance between a probability distribution and an algebraic variety. We consider the setting of finite state spaces and describe the solution depending on the choice of the ground metric…
Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization (DRO) has recently achieved empirical success for various applications in operations research and machine learning, owing partly to its regularization effect. Although connection between…
We study the revenue maximization problem with an imprecisely estimated distribution of a single buyer or several independent and identically distributed buyers given that this estimation is not far away from the true distribution. We use…
We describe an application of Wasserstein distance to Reinforcement Learning. The Wasserstein distance in question is between the distribution of mappings of trajectories of a policy into some metric space, and some other fixed distribution…
We study the multi-item mechanism design problem where a monopolist sells $n$ heterogeneous items to a single buyer. We focus on buy-many mechanisms, a natural class of mechanisms frequently used in practice. The buy-many property allows…
Maximizing the revenue from selling two or more goods has been shown to require the use of $nonmonotonic$ mechanisms, where a higher-valuation buyer may pay less than a lower-valuation one. Here we show that the restriction to $monotonic$…
We study the problem of learning revenue-optimal multi-bidder auctions from samples when the samples of bidders' valuations can be adversarially corrupted or drawn from distributions that are adversarially perturbed. First, we prove tight…