Related papers: Manipulating LLM Web Agents with Indirect Prompt I…
Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and…
Customer-service LLM agents increasingly make policy-bound decisions (refunds, rebooking, billing disputes), but the same ``helpful'' interaction style can be exploited: a small fraction of users can induce unauthorized concessions,…
Defenses against indirect prompt injection (IPI) in tool-using LLM agents share two structural weaknesses. First, they all attempt to prevent attacks rather than detect the compromises that slip through. Second, they have only been…
Prompt injection attacks aim to contaminate the input data of an LLM to mislead it into completing an attacker-chosen task instead of the intended task. In many applications and agents, the input data originates from multiple sources, with…
Large Language Models (LLMs) are combined with tools to create powerful LLM agents that provide a wide range of services. Unlike traditional software, LLM agent's behavior is determined at runtime by natural language prompts from either…
Enterprise penetration-testing is often limited by high operational costs and the scarcity of human expertise. This paper investigates the feasibility and effectiveness of using Large Language Model (LLM)-driven autonomous systems to…
Recent advancements in Web AI agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in addressing complex web navigation tasks. However, emerging research shows that these agents exhibit greater vulnerability compared to standalone Large…
Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents with function-calling capabilities are increasingly deployed, but remain vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks that hijack their tool calls. In response, numerous IPI-centric defense…
Open agentic systems combine LLM-based planning with external capabilities, persistent memory, and privileged execution. They are used in coding assistants, browser copilots, and enterprise automation. OpenClaw is a visible instance of this…
The wide-ranging applications of large language models (LLMs), especially in safety-critical domains, necessitate the proper evaluation of the LLM's adversarial robustness. This paper proposes an efficient tool to audit the LLM's…
Autonomous agentic AI systems powered by vision-language models (VLMs) are rapidly advancing toward real-world deployment, yet their cross-modal reasoning capabilities introduce new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation that exploit…
Autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, demonstrate remarkable capabilities in executing complex, long-horizon tasks. However, their tightly coupled instant-messaging interaction paradigm and high-privilege…
AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We…
Recent advances in ID-free recommender systems have attracted significant attention for effectively addressing the cold start problem. However, their vulnerability to malicious attacks remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we unveil a…
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on third-party API routers to dispatch tool-calling requests across multiple upstream providers. These routers operate as application-layer proxies with full plaintext access to every…
Previous benchmarks on prompt injection in large language models (LLMs) have primarily focused on generic tasks and attacks, offering limited insights into more complex threats like data exfiltration. This paper examines how prompt…
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in human-AI teams as support agents for complex tasks such as information retrieval, programming, and decision-making assistance. While these agents' autonomy and contextual knowledge…
LLM-based NLP systems typically work by embedding their input data into prompt templates which contain instructions and/or in-context examples, creating queries which are submitted to a LLM, and then parsing the LLM response in order to…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled agents to move beyond conversation toward end-to-end task execution and become more helpful. However, this helpfulness introduces new security risks stem less from direct interface abuse than from…
Indirect prompt injection attacks (IPIAs), where large language models (LLMs) follow malicious instructions hidden in input data, pose a critical threat to LLM-powered agents. In this paper, we present IntentGuard, a general defense…