Related papers: Comparisons of Experiments in Moral Hazard Problem…

Selection on moral hazard represents the tendency to select a specific health insurance coverage depending on the heterogeneity in utilisation ''slopes''. I use data from the Swiss Household Panel and from publicly available regulatory data…

In this paper we study the problem of information sharing among rational self-interested agents as a dynamic game of asymmetric information. We assume that the agents imperfectly observe a Markov chain and they are called to decide whether…

We consider a contracting problem in which a principal hires an agent to manage a risky project. When the agent chooses volatility components of the output process and the principal observes the output continuously, the principal can…

This paper considers dynamic moral hazard settings, in which the consequences of the agent's actions are not precisely understood. In a new continuous-time moral hazard model with drift ambiguity, the agent's unobservable action translates…

When a population is engaged in successive prisoner's dilemmas, indirect reciprocity through reputation fosters cooperation through the emergence of moral and action rules. A simplified model has recently been proposed where individuals…

Correlated equilibria enable a coordinator to influence the self-interested agents by recommending actions that no player has an incentive to deviate from. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism relies on accurate knowledge of the…

We explore the connection between an agent's decision problem and her ranking of information structures. We find that a finite amount of ordinal data on the agent's ranking of experiments is enough to identify her (finite) set of…

In the classical principal-agent problem, a principal must design a contract to incentivize an agent to perform an action on behalf of the principal. We study the classical principal-agent problem in a setting where the agent can be of one…

We propose a mechanism design framework that incorporates both soft information, which can be freely manipulated, and semi-hard information, which entails a cost for falsification. The framework captures various contexts such as school…

Tests for proportional hazards assumption concerning specified covariates or groups of covariates are proposed. The class of alternatives is wide: log-hazard rates under different values of covariates may cross, approach, go away. The data…

A broad current application of algorithms is in formal and quantitative measures of murky concepts -- like merit -- to make decisions. When people strategically respond to these sorts of evaluations in order to gain favorable decision…

We study a moral hazard problem with adverse selection: a risk-neutral agent can directly control the output distribution and possess private information about the production environment. The principal designs a menu of contracts satisfying…

Comparing the ranking of candidates by different voters is an important topic in social and information science with a high relevance from the point of view of practical applications. In general, ties and pairs of incomparable candidates…

In this manuscript, we study stochastic comparisons of the second-order statistics from dependent or independent observations with modified proportional hazard rates models. First, we establish the usual stochastic order of the second-order…

For three natural classes of dynamic decision problems; 1. additively separable problems, 2. discounted problems, and 3. discounted problems for a fixed discount factor; we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for one sequential…

We study a two-period moral hazard problem; there are two agents, with action sets that are unknown to the principal. The principal contracts with each agent sequentially, and seeks to maximize the worst-case discounted sum of payoffs,…

An agent acquires a costly flexible signal before making a decision. We explore to what degree knowledge of the agent's information costs helps predict her behavior. We establish an impossibility result: learning costs alone generate no…

Preference Inference involves inferring additional user preferences from elicited or observed preferences, based on assumptions regarding the form of the user's preference relation. In this paper we consider a situation in which…

Conditional mutual information is important in the selection and interpretation of graphical models. Its empirical version is well known as a generalised likelihood ratio test and that it may be represented as a difference in entropy. We…

We consider a model where an agent is must choose between alternatives that each provide only an imprecise description of the world (e.g. linguistic expressions). The set of alternatives is closed under logical conjunction and disjunction,…