Related papers: Contracting with a Mechanism Designer
Motivated by the emergence of decentralized machine learning (ML) ecosystems, we study the delegation of data collection. Taking the field of contract theory as our starting point, we design optimal and near-optimal contracts that deal with…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
Platform giants in China have operated with persistently compressed margins in highly concentrated markets for much of the past decade, despite market shares exceeding 60\% in core segments. Standard theory predicts otherwise: either the…
Metaverse as the next-generation Internet provides users with physical-virtual world interactions. To improve the quality of immersive experience, users access to Metaverse service providers (MSPs) and purchase bandwidth resource to reduce…
This paper analyzes optimal insurance design when the insurer internalizes the effect of coverage on third-party service prices. A monopolistic insurer contracts with risk-averse agents who have sequential two-dimensional private…
What type of delegation contract should be offered when facing a risk of the magnitude of the pandemic we are currently experiencing and how does the likelihood of an exogenous early termination of the relationship modify the terms of a…
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference, e.g. in the facility location games all agents would like…
Online platforms in the Internet Economy commonly incorporate recommender systems that recommend products (or "arms") to users (or "agents"). A key challenge in this domain arises from myopic agents who are naturally incentivized to exploit…
The availability of public computing resources in the cloud has revolutionized data analysis, but requesting cloud resources often involves complex decisions for consumers. Under the current pricing mechanisms, cloud service providers offer…
While microtask crowdsourcing provides a new way to solve large volumes of small tasks at a much lower price compared with traditional in-house solutions, it suffers from quality problems due to the lack of incentives. On the other hand,…
A distributed, hierarchical, market based approach is introduced to solve the economic dispatch problem. The approach requires only a minimal amount of information to be shared between a central market operator and the end-users. Price…
This paper studies continuous-time optimal contracting in a hierarchy problem which generalises the model of Sung (2015). The hierarchy is modeled by a series of interlinked principal-agent problems, leading to a sequence of Stackelberg…
In a multi-party machine learning system, different parties cooperate on optimizing towards better models by sharing data in a privacy-preserving way. A major challenge in learning is the incentive issue. For example, if there is…
We study the problem of collaborative machine learning markets where multiple parties can achieve improved performance on their machine learning tasks by combining their training data. We discuss desired properties for these machine…
The rise of algorithmic pricing in online retail platforms has attracted significant interest in how autonomous software agents interact under competition. This article explores the potential emergence of algorithmic collusion -…
We consider the principal-agent problem with heterogeneous agents. Previous works assume that the principal signs independent incentive contracts with every agent to make them invest more efforts on the tasks. However, in many…
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…
In crowdsourcing markets, there are two different type jobs, i.e. homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs, which need to be allocated to workers. Incentive mechanisms are essential to attract extensive user participating for achieving good…
Incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing have been extensively studied under the framework of all-pay auctions. Along a distinct line, this paper proposes to use Tullock contests as an alternative tool to design incentive mechanisms for…
A platform commits to a search algorithm that maps prices to search order. Given this algorithm, sellers set prices, and consumers engage in sequential search. This framework generalizes the ordered search literature. We introduce a special…