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We consider dynamic games defined over an infinite horizon, characterized by linear, discrete-time dynamics and quadratic cost functionals. Considering such linear-quadratic (LQ) dynamic games, we focus on their solutions in terms Nash…
Non-cooperative dynamic game theory provides a principled approach to modeling sequential decision-making among multiple noncommunicative agents. A key focus has been on finding Nash equilibria in two-agent zero-sum dynamic games under…
Optimization of deep learning algorithms to approach Nash Equilibrium remains a significant problem in imperfect information games, e.g. StarCraft and poker. Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) has provided an effective way to learn…
Considering linear-quadratic discrete-time games with unknown input/output/state (i/o/s) dynamics and state, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of feedback Nash equilibria (FNE) in the…
Extensive-form games provide a versatile framework for modeling interactions of multiple agents subjected to imperfect observations and stochastic events. In recent years, two paradigms, policy space response oracles (PSRO) and…
In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…
This paper mainly investigates a class of distributed Variational Generalized Nash Equilibrium (VGNE) seeking problems for both online noncooperative games and online aggregative games with time-varying coupling inequality constraints. Two…
Finding equilibria via gradient play in competitive multi-agent games has been attracting a growing amount of attention in recent years, with emphasis on designing efficient strategies where the agents operate in a decentralized and…
Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
Characterizing the performance of no-regret dynamics in multi-player games is a foundational problem at the interface of online learning and game theory. Recent results have revealed that when all players adopt specific learning algorithms,…
We study the computation of equilibria of anonymous games, via algorithms that may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the game's payoff function, assumed to be unknown initially. The general topic we consider is \emph{query…
Theory of quantum games is relatively new to the literature and its applications to various areas of research are being explored. It is a novel interpretation of strategies and decisions in quantum domain. In the earlier work on quantum…
No-regret learning dynamics play a central role in game theory, enabling decentralized convergence to equilibrium for concepts such as Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) or Correlated Equilibrium (CE). In this work, we improve the…
Feedback Nash equilibrium strategies in multi-agent dynamic games require availability of all players' state information to compute control actions. However, in real-world scenarios, sensing and communication limitations between agents make…
We introduce a distributionally robust minimium mean square error estimation model with a Wasserstein ambiguity set to recover an unknown signal from a noisy observation. The proposed model can be viewed as a zero-sum game between a…
Learning from repeated play in a fixed two-player zero-sum game is a classic problem in game theory and online learning. We consider a variant of this problem where the game payoff matrix changes over time, possibly in an adversarial…
We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur…