Related papers: On Probabilistic Assignment Rules
We study the classical probabilistic assignment problem, where finitely many indivisible objects are to be probabilistically or proportionally assigned among an equal number of agents. Each agent has an initial deterministic endowment and a…
This paper studies multi-object reallocation without monetary transfers, where agents initially own multiple indivisible objects and have strict preferences over bundles (e.g., shift exchange among workers at a firm). Focusing on marginal…
We study the object reallocation problem under strict preferences. On the unrestricted domain, Ekici (2024) showed that the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is the unique mechanism that is individually rational, pair efficient, and…
This paper considers the problem of randomly assigning a set of objects to a set of agents based on the ordinal preferences of agents. We generalize the well-known immediate acceptance algorithm to the afore-mentioned random environments…
For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.…
We study the problem of exchange when 1) agents are endowed with heterogeneous indivisible objects, and 2) there is no money. In general, no rule satisfies the three central properties Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and…
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…
A central problem in multiagent systems is the fair assignment of objects to agents. In this paper, we initiate the analysis of classic majoritarian social choice functions in assignment. Exploiting the special structure of the assignment…
A fundamental resource allocation setting is the random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects that are then randomly allocated to the agents. In 2001, Bogomolnaia and Moulin presented the probabilistic serial…
We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive at most one. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial…
We consider a housing market model with limited externalities where agents care both about their own consumption via demand preferences and about the agent who receives their endowment via supply preferences (we extend the associated…
We study the implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules via simply dominant mechanisms (Pycia and Troyan, 2019) in the context of assignment problems, where agents are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and…
We study the problem of assigning objects to agents in the presence of arbitrary linear constraints when agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects. Our main contribution is the generalization of the (Extended) Probabilistic…
We consider the multi-unit random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects and objects are allocated to agents randomly based on the preferences. The most well-established preference relation to compare random…
We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top Trading Cycles, TTC) to the allocation generated by the…
We study stochastic object assignment problems in which objects may have minimum and maximum requirements, such as with classes with upper and lower enrollment bounds. We construct a new random assignment mechanism, the minimums…
Consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents with strict ordinal preferences over objects, where each agent is interested in consuming at most one object, and objects have integer minimum and maximum quotas. We define an…
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the…
This paper focuses on the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating resources to agents. We consider a specific setting, usually referred to as a housing market, where each agent must receive exactly one resource (and initially owns…
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the…