Related papers: The stability of bi-polarization on dynamical dire…
Uni-directional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model in a dynamical directed network. We analytically obtain the degree distribution…
Empirical studies suggest a deep intertwining between opinion formation and decision-making processes, but these have been treated as separate problems in the study of dynamical models for social networks. In this paper, we bridge the gap…
From a self-centered perspective, it can be assumed that people only hold opinions that can benefit them. If opinions have no intrinsic value, and acquire their value when held by the majority of individuals in a discussion group, then we…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
We consider two-opinion voter models on dense dynamic random graphs. Our goal is to understand and describe the occurrence of consensus versus polarisation over long periods of time. The former means that all vertices have the same opinion,…
The voter model on networks is crucial to understand opinion formation. Uni-directional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model on a…
Opinion dynamics on social networks have been received considerable attentions in recent years. Nevertheless, just a few works have theoretically analyzed the condition in which a certain opinion can spread in the whole structured…
Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…
In a social network, individuals express their opinions on several interdependent topics, and therefore the evolution of their opinions on these topics is also mutually dependent. In this work, we propose a differential game model for the…
We study an opinion dynamics model that explores the competition between persuasion and compromise in a population of agents with nearest-neighbor interactions on a two-dimensional square lattice. Each agent can hold either a positive or a…
The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in real situations, the strategic environment varies as a result of past…
A noncooperative differential (dynamic) game model of opinion dynamics is proposed. In this game, the agents' motives are shaped by their expectations of the nature of others' opinions as well as how susceptible they are to get influenced…
Learning processes in games explain how players grapple with one another in seeking an equilibrium. We study a natural model of learning based on individual gradients in two-player continuous games. In such games, the arguably natural…
The most popular stability notion in games should be Nash equilibrium under the rationality of players who maximize their own payoff individually. In contrast, in many scenarios, players can be (partly) irrational with some unpredictable…
The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced by Smith and Price, is a refinement of Nash equilibrium in 2-player symmetric games in order to explain counter-intuitive natural phenomena, whose existence is not…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
The Naming Game is a classic model for studying the emergence and evolution of language within a population. In this paper, we extend the traditional Naming Game model to encompass multiple committed opinions and investigate the system…
In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…
A social network population engages in collective actions as a direct result of forming a particular opinion. The strategic interactions among the individuals acting independently and selfishly naturally portray a noncooperative game. Nash…