Related papers: Truth and meaningfulness
We analyze the informal notion of truth and conclude that it can be formalized in essentially two distinct ways: constructively, in terms of provability, or classically, as a hierarchy of concepts which satisfy Tarski's biconditional in…
Tarski's undefinability theorem states that a formal system based on conventional predicate logic (PL) cannot talk about its own truth predicate. PL is, however, not the only formal language imaginable. In this paper, it will be shown that…
We propose a constructive interpretation of truth which resolves the standard semantic paradoxes.
Ordinary and transfinite recursion and induction and ZF set theory are used to construct from a fully interpreted object language and from an extra formula a new language. It is fully interpreted under a suitably defined interpretation.…
We propose axioms governing the interaction of constructive assertibility and meaningfulness predicates with a self-applicative truth predicate characterized by the T-scheme, and we prove the consistency of the resulting formal system.
The aim of this text is to present, in a technically accessible way, Tarski's definition of truth, the indefinability theorem, and to discuss two aspects of Tarski's work on truth, namely, whether or not the definition captures the notion…
Iterated reflection principles have been employed extensively to unfold epistemic commitments that are incurred by accepting a mathematical theory. Recently this has been applied to theories of truth. The idea is to start with a collection…
Knowing the truth is rarely enough -- we also seek out reasons why the fact is true. While much is known about how we explain contingent truths, we understand less about how we explain facts, such as those in mathematics, that are true as a…
Our main result (Theorem A) shows the incompleteness of any consistent sequential theory T formulated in a finite language such that T is axiomatized by a collection of sentences of bounded quantifier-alternation-depth. Our proof employs an…
Every countable language which conforms to classical logic is shown to have an extension which conforms to classical logic, and has a definitional theory of truth. That extension has a semantical theory of truth, if every sentence of the…
The concept of informal mathematical proof considered in intuitionism is apparently vulnerable to a version of the liar paradox. However, a careful reevaluation of this concept reveals a subtle error whose correction blocks the…
The fact that the famous Godel incompleteness theorem and the archetype of all logical paradoxes, that of the Liar, are related closely is, of course, not only well known, but is a part of the common knowledge of logician community.…
Tarski's semantic definition of truth is the composition of its extensional and intensional aspects. Abstract satisfaction, the core of the semantic definition of truth, is the basis for the theory of institutions (Goguen and Burstall). The…
Logical paradoxes and inconsistent information pose deep challenges in epistemology and the philosophy of logic. Classical systems typically handle contradictions only through external checks or by altering the logical framework, as in…
We study the structure of the partial order induced by the definability relation on definitions of truth for the language of arithmetic. Formally, a definition of truth is any sentence $\alpha$ which extends a weak arithmetical theory…
This work uses mostly model-theoretic methods to establish new proof-theoretic theorems about several axiomatic theories of truth over KP (Kripke-Platek set theory) and stronger theories, especially ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory).
This short note introduces a formal system of truth and paradoxicality, outlining the main motivation, and proving its $\omega$-consistency. The system is called TP, for 'Truth and Paradoxicality'.
Inspired by the early Wittgenstein's concept of nonsense (meaning that which lies beyond the limits of language), we investigate two different types of nonsense: formal nonsense and pragmatic nonsense. The simpler notion of formal nonsense…
We present a version of G\"odel's Second Incompleteness Theorem for recursively enumerable consistent extensions of a fixed axiomatizable theory, by incorporating some bi-theoretic version of the derivability conditions. We also argue that…
Librationist set theory \pounds ${}$ is developed. It descends from semantics for truth, initiated by Kripke, and others. # extends \pounds, of Librationist closures of the paradoxes in Logic and Logical Philosophy 21(4), 323-361, 2012.…