Related papers: Truthful, Credible, and Optimal Auctions for Matro…
In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is bought and sold by multiple buyers and…
In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to…
We consider truthful combinatorial auctions with items $M = [m]$ for sale to $n$ bidders, where each bidder $i$ has a private monotone valuation $v_i : 2^M \to R_+$. Among truthful mechanisms, maximal-in-range (MIR) mechanisms achieve the…
Small operators who take part in secondary wireless spectrum markets typically have strict budget limits. In this paper, we study the bidding problem of a budget constrained operator in repeated secondary spectrum auctions. In existing…
The integration of advertising auction mechanisms into large language model (LLM)-based chatbots presents a significant opportunity for commercialization, yet poses unique challenges in balancing relevance, efficiency, and user experience.…
Auto-bidding is now widely adopted as an interface between advertisers and internet advertising as it allows advertisers to specify high-level goals, such as maximizing value subject to a value-per-spend constraint. Prior research has…
Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applications of microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usually designed to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations and to assure both the…
Auctions are key for maximizing sellers' revenue and ensuring truthful bidding among buyers. Recently, an approach known as differentiable economics based on machine learning (ML) has shown promise in learning powerful auction mechanisms…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among strategic agents. We focus on settings wherein monetary transfers are not available and each agent's private valuation is a submodular function with binary marginals, i.e., the…
Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to…
We study the classic single-item auction setting of Myerson, but under the assumption that the buyers' values for the item are distributed over finite supports. Using strong LP duality and polyhedral theory, we rederive various key results…
We design a framework for truthful double multi-channel spectrum auctions where each seller (or buyer) can sell (or buy) multiple spectrum channels based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing…
Decentralised cloud computing platforms enable individuals to offer and rent resources in a peer-to-peer fashion. They must assign resources from multiple sellers to multiple buyers and derive prices that match the interests and capacities…
We study blockchain trade-intent auctions, which currently intermediate about USD 10 billion in trades each month. These auctions are combinatorial because executing multiple trade intents jointly generates additional efficiencies. However,…
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…
Optimizing the advertiser's cumulative value of winning impressions under budget constraints poses a complex challenge in online advertising, under the paradigm of AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB). Advertisers often have personalized objectives…
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…
A seller wants to sell a good to a set of bidders using a credible mechanism. We show that when the seller has private information about her cost, it is impossible for a static mechanism to achieve the optimal revenue. In particular, even…
This manuscript presents an alternative implementation of the truthful-in-expectation mechanism of Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan for combinatorial auctions with weighted-matroid-rank-sum valuations. The new implementation uses only value…
Ad exchanges are kind of the most popular online advertising marketplaces for trading ad spaces over the Internet. Ad exchanges run auctions to sell diverse ad spaces on the publishers' web-pages to advertisers, who want to display ads on…