Related papers: Refinements of provability and consistency princip…
We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable consistency intended to reflect the actual consistency property of human beings. Then we give a generalization of the first and second G\"odel incompleteness theorem to stably…
We investigate relationships between versions of derivability conditions for provability predicates. We show several implications and non-implications between the conditions, and we discuss unprovability of consistency statements induced by…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is proved for Herbrand consistency of some arithmetical theories with bounded induction, by using a technique of logarithmic shrinking the witnesses of bounded formulas, due to Z. Adamowicz [Herbrand…
We prove, for stably computably enumerable formal systems, direct analogues of the first and second incompleteness theorems of G\"odel. A typical stably computably enumerable set is the set of Diophantine equations with no integer…
It is proved that if $T$ is a $\Sigma_{n+1}$ Definable theory which is $\Sigma_n$-sound and extends $PA$, then $T$ can not prove the sentence $\Sigma_n-sound(T)$ that expresses the $\Sigma_n$-soundness of $T$. Optimality of this result is…
The prevalent interpretation of G\"odel's Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory does not prove its consistency. It is however not entirely clear how to justify this informal reading, as the formulation of…
We give a new proof for Godel's second incompleteness theorem, based on Kolmogorov complexity, Chaitin's incompleteness theorem, and an argument that resembles the surprise examination paradox. We then go the other way around and suggest…
G{\"o}del's second incompleteness theorem forbids to prove, in a given theory U, the consistency of many theories-in particular, of the theory U itself-as well as it forbids to prove the normalization property for these theories, since this…
Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem is generalized to definable theories, which are not necessarily recursively enumerable, by using a couple of syntactic-semantic notions, one is the consistency of a theory with the set of all true…
In much discussed work Artemov has recently shown that, for $\mathrm{PA}$, the consistency schema admits a form of uniform verification via selector proofs, despite the unprovability of the corresponding uniform consistency sentence…
We derive a consistency result, in the $L_1$-sense, for incomplete U-statistics in the non-standard case where the kernel at hand has infinite second-order moments. Assuming that the kernel has finite moments of order $p(\geq 1)$, we obtain…
For Hilbert, the consistency of a formal theory T is an infinite series of statements "D is free of contradictions" for each derivation D and a consistency proof is i) an operation that, given D, yields a proof that D is free of…
In the paper we introduce a weak set theory $\mathsf{H}_{<\omega}$ . A formalization of arithmetic on finite von Neumann ordinals gives an embedding of arithmetical language into this theory. We show that $\mathsf{H}_{<\omega}$ proves a…
We offer a mathematical proof of consistency for Peano Arithmetic PA formalizable in PA. This result is compatible with Goedel's Second Incompleteness Theorem since our consistency proof does not rely on the representation of consistency as…
We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some…
After highlighting the cases in which the semantics of a language cannot be mechanically reproduced (in which case it is called inherent), the main epistemological consequences of the first incompleteness Theorem for the two fundamental…
This paper is a continuation of Arai's paper on derivability conditions for Rosser provability predicates. We investigate the limitations of the second incompleteness theorem by constructing three different Rosser provability predicates…
A formalisation of G\"odel's incompleteness theorems using the Isabelle proof assistant is described. This is apparently the first mechanical verification of the second incompleteness theorem. The work closely follows {\'S}wierczkowski…
We study abstract versions of G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem and formulate generalizations of L\"ob's derivability conditions that work for logics weaker than the classical one. We isolate the role of contraction rule in G\"odel's…