Related papers: Local Strategy-proofness and Dictatorship
A common assumption in modern microeconomic theory is that choice should be rationalizable via a binary preference relation, which \citeauthor{Sen71a} showed to be equivalent to two consistency conditions, namely $\alpha$ (contraction) and…
Team Semantics generalizes Tarski's Semantics by defining satisfaction with respect to sets of assignments rather than with respect to single assignments. Because of this, it is possible to use Team Semantics to extend First Order Logic via…
In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not to do so. I then show that under the…
This paper studies the synthesis of control policies for an agent that has to satisfy a temporal logic specification in a partially observable environment, in the presence of an adversary. The interaction of the agent (defender) with the…
In the field of Judgment Aggrgation, a domain, that is a subset of a Cartesian power of $\{0,1\}$, is considered to reflect abstract rationality restrictions on vectors of two-valued judgments on a number of issues. We are interested in the…
We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations,…
Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice…
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines, given some choice rule, whether there exists an obviously strategy-proof mechanism for that choice rule.
This work contributes to a foundational question in economic theory: how do individual-level cognitive biases interact with collective choice mechanisms? We study a setting where voters hold intrinsic preference rankings over a set of…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is a cornerstone of social choice theory, stating that an onto social choice function cannot be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial if the number of alternatives is at least three. The Duggan-Schwartz…
It is well known that Random Serial Dictatorship is strategy-proof and leads to a Pareto-Efficient outcome. We show that this result breaks down when individuals are allowed to make transfers, and adapt Random Serial Dictatorship to…
We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked…
Multi-winner approval-based voting has received considerable attention recently. A voting rule in this setting takes as input ballots in which each agent approves a subset of the available alternatives and outputs a committee of…
A menu description exposes strategyproofness by presenting a mechanism to player $i$ in two steps. Step (1) uses others' reports to describe $i$'s menu of potential outcomes. Step (2) uses $i$'s report to select $i$'s favorite outcome from…
In the last years the Prisoner Dilemma (PD) has become a paradigm for the study of the emergence of cooperation in spatially structured populations. Such structure is usually assumed to be given by a graph. In general, the success of…
This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that any constitution which satisfies Transitivity, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity is a dictatorship. Wilson derived properties of constitutions satisfying Transitivity and…
Deterrence coalitions that collectively own their deterrence technology, need an institutional design to decide when to retaliate against an attack or incident. This choice of institutional design, formalized through a social choice…
Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain incentive compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, e.g., those who struggle with contingent reasoning [Li, 2015]. However, it…