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Information policies such as scores, ratings, and recommendations are increasingly shaping society's choices in high-stakes domains. We provide a framework to study the welfare implications of information policies on a population of…
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms shape our lives. Banks use them to determine if we are good borrowers; IT companies delegate them recruitment decisions; police apply ML for crime-prediction, and judges base their verdicts on ML. However,…
Consider a barter exchange problem over a finite set of agents, where each agent owns an item and is also associated with a (privately known) wish list of items belonging to the other agents. An outcome of the problem is a (re)allocation of…
Consider the seller's problem of finding optimal prices for her $n$ (divisible) goods when faced with a set of $m$ consumers, given that she can only observe their purchased bundles at posted prices, i.e., revealed preferences. We study…
Fairness and privacy are two important concerns in social decision-making processes such as resource allocation. We study privacy in the fair allocation of indivisible resources using the well-established framework of differential privacy.…
We analyze the optimal information design in a click-through auction with fixed valuations per click, but stochastic click-through rates. While the auctioneer takes as given the auction rule of the click-through auction, namely the…
Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity…
We present an experimental and simulated model of a multi-agent stock market driven by a double auction order matching mechanism. Studying the effect of cumulative information on the performance of traders, we find a non monotonic…
We investigate the tradeoff between privacy and utility in a situation where both privacy and utility are measured in terms of mutual information. For the binary case, we fully characterize this tradeoff in case of perfect privacy and also…
We model real-world data markets, where sellers post fixed prices and buyers are free to purchase from any set of sellers, as a simultaneous game. A key component here is the negative externality buyers induce on one another due to data…
We perform a simulation-based analysis of keyword auctions modeled as one-shot games of incomplete information to study a series of mechanism design questions. Our first question addresses the degree to which incentive compatibility fails…
We study incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize the Nash Social Welfare. Since traditional incentive-compatible mechanisms cannot maximize the Nash Social Welfare even approximately, we propose changing the traditional model.…
Influence maximization (IM) has garnered a lot of attention in the literature owing to applications such as viral marketing and infection containment. It aims to select a small number of seed users to adopt an item such that adoption…
We provide sufficient conditions for revenue maximization in a two-good monopoly where the buyer's values for the items come from independent (but not necessarily identical) distributions over bounded intervals. Under certain distributional…
Reconstructing the structural connectivity between interacting units from observed activity is a challenge across many different disciplines. The fundamental first step is to establish whether or to what extent the interactions between the…
We address the practical problems of estimating the information relations that characterize large networks. Building on methods developed for analysis of the neural code, we show that reliable estimates of mutual information can be obtained…
Mechanism design in resource allocation studies dividing limited resources among self-interested agents whose satisfaction with the allocation depends on privately held utilities. We consider the problem in a payment-free setting, with the…
Interactions between elements, which are usually represented by networks, have to delineate potentially unequal relationships in terms of their relative importance or direction. The intrinsic unequal relationships of such kind, however, are…
The cooperation mechanism of indirect reciprocity has been studied by making multiple variations of its parts. This research proposes a new variant of Nowak and Sigmund model, focused on agents' attitude; it is called Individualistic…
We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism…