Related papers: A few good choices

Domination problems in general can capture situations in which some entities have an effect on other entities (and sometimes on themselves). The usual goal is to select a minimum number of entities that can influence a target group of…

We present a relation-algebraic model of Condorcet voting and, based on it, relation-algebraic solutions of the constructive control problem via the removal of voters. We consider two winning conditions, viz. to be a Condorcet winner and to…

We consider a spatial voting model where both candidates and voters are positioned in the $d$-dimensional Euclidean space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their proximity to the voter's ideal point. We focus on the scenario where…

We study how electoral rules shape polarization dynamics when voters and candidates both adapt to repeated election outcomes. We introduce two geometric primitives for comparing rules under this feedback: the \emph{winner radius} $R_t =…

We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…

The goal of this paper is twofold. First and foremost, we aim to experimentally and quantitatively show that the choice of a multiwinner voting rule can play a crucial role on the way minorities are represented. We also test the possibility…

A More Sums Than Differences (MSTD, or sum-dominant) set is a finite set $A\subset \mathbb{Z}$ such that $|A+A|<|A-A|$. Though it was believed that the percentage of subsets of $\{0,...,n\}$ that are sum-dominant tends to zero, in 2006…

A new game-theoretic approach for combining multiple classifiers is proposed. A short introduction in Game Theory and coalitions illustrate the way any collective decision scheme can be viewed as a competitive game of coalitions that are…

The Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) framework offers a simple and sound basis for representing and solving simple decision problems, without uncertainty. This paper is devoted to an extension of the CSP framework enabling us to deal…

Partial vertex cover and partial dominating set are two well-investigated optimization problems. While they are $\rm W[1]$-hard on general graphs, they have been shown to be fixed-parameter tractable on many sparse graph classes, including…

A tree with $n$ vertices has at most $95^{n/13}$ minimal dominating sets. The growth constant $\lambda = \sqrt[13]{95} \approx 1.4194908$ is best possible. It is obtained in a semi-automatic way as a kind of "dominant eigenvalue" of a…

We study deliberative social choice, where voters engage in small-group discussions to output collective preferences that are then aggregated by a social choice rule. We introduce a simple deliberation-via-matching protocol. In this…

We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints,…

We study the classic {\sc Dominating Set} problem with respect to several prominent parameters. Specifically, we present algorithmic results that sidestep time complexity barriers by the incorporation of either approximation or larger…

In social choice there often arises a conflict between the majority principle (the search for a candidate that is as good as possible for as many voters as possible), and the protection of minority rights (choosing a candidate that is not…

Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever the preferences of all voters belong to this set, the majority relation has no cycles. We observe that, without loss of generality, such domain can be assumed to…

Consider the following social choice problem. Suppose we have a set of $n$ voters and $m$ candidates that lie in a metric space. The goal is to design a mechanism to choose a candidate whose average distance to the voters is as small as…

A $k$-majority tournament $T$ on a finite set of vertices $V$ is defined by a set of $2k-1$ linear orders on $V$, with an edge $u \to v$ in $T$ if $u>v$ in a majority of the linear orders. We think of the linear orders as voter preferences…

The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministically select a winner in an election among more than two candidates; the only definite collective preferences are between individual pairs of…

A primary challenge in metagenomics is reconstructing individual microbial genomes from the mixture of short fragments created by sequencing. Recent work leverages the sparsity of the assembly graph to find $r$-dominating sets which enable…