Related papers: Linear-Quadratic Discrete-Time Dynamic Games with …
Dynamic games provide a fundamental framework for multi-agent decision-making over time, yet computing feedback Nash equilibria (FNEs) in infinite-horizon discrete-time linear-quadratic (LQ) settings remains computationally challenging.…
We consider dynamic games defined over an infinite horizon, characterized by linear, discrete-time dynamics and quadratic cost functionals. Considering such linear-quadratic (LQ) dynamic games, we focus on their solutions in terms Nash…
Finite-horizon linear quadratic (LQ) games admit a unique Nash equilibrium, while infinite-horizon settings may have multiple. We clarify the relationship between these two cases by interpreting the finite-horizon equilibrium as a nonlinear…
$ $This paper addresses the inverse problem for Linear-Quadratic (LQ) nonzero-sum $N$-player differential games, where the goal is to learn parameters of an unknown cost function for the game, called observed, given the demonstrated…
This paper presents algorithms for non-zero sum nonlinear constrained dynamic games with full information. Such problems emerge when multiple players with action constraints and differing objectives interact with the same dynamic system.…
We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…
We investigate a novel finite-horizon linear-quadratic (LQ) feedback dynamic potential game with a priori unknown cost matrices played between two players. The cost matrices are revealed to the players sequentially, with the potential for…
Dynamic games offer a versatile framework for modeling the evolving interactions of strategic agents, whose steady-state behavior can be captured by the Nash equilibria of the games. Nash equilibria are often computed in feedback, with…
We consider dynamic games with linear dynamics and quadratic objective functions. We observe that the unconstrained open-loop Nash equilibrium coincides with a linear quadratic regulator in an augmented space, thus deriving an explicit…
In this letter, we study a model-based inverse problem for infinite-horizon linear-quadratic differential games with descriptor dynamics. Given an observed feedback strategy profile, we seek to identify all cost functions that rationalize…
In this paper, we study infinite-horizon linear-quadratic uncertain differential games with an output feedback information structure. We assume linear time-invariant nominal dynamics influenced by deterministic external disturbances, and…
Non-cooperative dynamic game theory provides a principled approach to modeling sequential decision-making among multiple noncommunicative agents. A key focus has been on finding Nash equilibria in two-agent zero-sum dynamic games under…
We consider constrained linear-quadratic dynamic games arising in autonomous vehicle platooning, intersection crossing and other cooperative driving scenarios. Infinite-horizon Nash equilibria are reformulated as receding-horizon affine…
We study finite-horizon two-player zero-sum differential games with one-sided payoff information ($G$), where the informed player (P1) knows the game payoff, while P2 only has a public belief over a finite set of possible payoffs. In this…
Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…
We present the concept of a Generalized Feedback Nash Equilibrium (GFNE) in dynamic games, extending the Feedback Nash Equilibrium concept to games in which players are subject to state and input constraints. We formalize necessary and…
We consider a non-zero-sum linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) dynamic game with asymmetric information. Each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world $V$, resulting in dependent private observations. We study…
For the characterization of Feedback Nash Equilibria (FNE) in linear quadratic games, this paper provides a detailed analysis of the discrete-time discounted coupled best-response equations for the scalar two-player setting, together with a…
We consider a class of smooth $N$-player noncooperative games, where player objectives are expectation-valued and potentially nonconvex. In such a setting, we consider the largely open question of efficiently computing a suitably defined…
We formulate and study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic dynamic games with partial and asymmetric information. Information asymmetry introduces fundamental challenges involving \emph{belief representation} and \emph{theory of mind}…