Related papers: Optimal Type-Dependent Liquid Welfare Guarantees f…
Incentives are key to the success of crowdsourcing which heavily depends on the level of user participation. This paper designs an incentive mechanism to motivate a heterogeneous crowd of users to actively participate in crowdsourcing…
We prove impossibility results for adaptivity in non-smooth stochastic convex optimization. Given a set of problem parameters we wish to adapt to, we define a "price of adaptivity" (PoA) that, roughly speaking, measures the multiplicative…
Today's multiagent systems have grown too complex to rely on centralized controllers, prompting increasing interest in the design of distributed algorithms. In this respect, game theory has emerged as a valuable tool to complement more…
We obtain revenue guarantees for the simple pricing mechanism of a single posted price, in terms of a natural parameter of the distribution of buyers' valuations. Our revenue guarantee applies to the single item n buyers setting, with…
2026 has brought an explosion of interest in LLM-guided evolution of agentic artifacts, with systems like GEPA and Autoresearch demonstrating that LLMs can iteratively improve prompts, code, and agent architectures across diverse domains.…
Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While…
The literature on the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of simple auctions employs a no-overbidding assumption but has completely overlooked the no-underbidding phenomenon, which is evident in empirical studies on variants of the second price auction.…
We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same…
A central decision maker (CDM), who seeks an efficient allocation of scarce resources among a finite number of players, often has to incorporate fairness criteria to avoid unfair outcomes. Indeed, the Price of Fairness (POF), a term coined…
We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where each agent deems their allocated portion relative to their…
We study independent private values auction environments in which the auctioneer's revenue depends nonlinearly on bidders' interim winning probabilities. Our framework accommodates heterogeneity among bidders and places no ad hoc…
We study fair allocation of constrained resources, where a market designer optimizes overall welfare while maintaining group fairness. In many large-scale settings, utilities are not known in advance, but are instead observed after…
Advertisers in online ad auctions are increasingly using auto-bidding mechanisms to bid into auctions instead of directly bidding their value manually. One prominent auto-bidding format is the target cost-per-acquisition (tCPA) which…
We investigate traffic routing both from the perspective of theory as well as real world data. First, we introduce a new type of games: $\theta$-free flow games. Here, commuters only consider, in their strategy sets, paths whose free-flow…
The robustness of multiagent systems can be affected by mistakes or behavioral biases (e.g., risk-aversion, altruism, toll-sensitivity), with some agents playing the "wrong game." This can change the set of equilibria, and may in turn harm…
Crowdsourcing services, such as Waze, leverage a mass of mobile users to learn massive point-of-interest (PoI) information while traveling and share it as a public good. Given that crowdsourced users mind their travel costs and possess…
We study a multi-agent contracting problem where agents exert costly effort to achieve individually observable binary outcomes. While the principal can theoretically extract the full social welfare using a discriminatory contract that…
Over the past few years, more and more Internet advertisers have started using automated bidding for optimizing their advertising campaigns. Such advertisers have an optimization goal (e.g. to maximize conversions), and some constraints…
We study the allocative challenges that governmental and nonprofit organizations face when tasked with equitable and efficient rationing of a social good among agents whose needs (demands) realize sequentially and are possibly correlated.…
The paper designs revenue-maximizing auction mechanisms for agents who aim to maximize their total obtained values rather than the classical quasi-linear utilities. Several models have been proposed to capture the behaviors of such agents…