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Experimental one-way decoy pulse quantum key distribution running continuously for 60 hours is demonstrated over a fiber distance of 20km. We employ a decoy protocol which involves one weak decoy pulse and a vacuum pulse. The obtained…
The length of a secure link over which a quantum key can be distributed depends on the efficiency and dark-count rate of the detectors used at the receiver. We report on the first demonstration of quantum key distribution using…
The article is focused on research of an attack on the quantum key distribution system and proposes a countermeasure method. Particularly noteworthy is that this is not a classic attack on a quantum protocol. We describe an attack on the…
The technological possibilities of a realistic eavesdropper are discussed. Two eavesdropping strategies taking profit of multiphoton pulses in faint laser QKD are presented. We conclude that, as long as storage of Qubits is technically…
The phase randomized light is one of the key assumptions in the security proof of Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol implemented with an attenuated laser. Though the assumption has been believed to be…
In the transmitter of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, a dense wavelength-division multiplexer (DWDM) is typically used to combine quantum and synchronization signals and is directly connected to the quantum channel. As a result, it…
In ultralong fiber laser key distribution, two sides use standard optical equipment to create kilometer long fiber lasers in a communication link to establish a secret key. Its security rests on the assumption that any attacker would need…
A simple photon-number splitting attack is described which works on any lossy quantum key distribution system with a multi-photon source independently of the mean source photon number, and with no induced error rate. In particular, it…
The existing decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) beating photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack provides a more accurate method to estimate secure key rate, while it still considers that only single-photon pulses can generate secure…
How to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem---*measurement* device independent quantum key distribution. It not only removes all…
Imperfect devices in commercial quantum key distribution systems open security loopholes that an eavesdropper may exploit. An example of one such imperfection is the wavelength dependent coupling ratio of the fiber beam splitter. Utilizing…
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) is severely threatened by discrepancies between realistic devices and theoretical assumptions. Recently, a significant framework called the reference technique was proposed to provide security…
Quantum communications promise to revolutionise the way information is exchanged and protected. Unlike their classical counterpart, they are based on dim optical pulses that cannot be amplified by conventional optical repeaters.…
Quantum Key Distribution with the BB84 protocol has been shown to be unconditionally secure even using weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon signals. The distances that can be covered by these methods are limited due to the loss in…
In this paper, we investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of a differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. Specifically, we analyze a sequential attack…
We present the application of quantum key distribution technologies to fiber-based broadband passive optical access networks. This application is based on our 850 nm wavelength gigahertz clock-rate single-receiver system, is compatible with…
Quantum key distribution is unbreakable in theory but may be hacked via imperfections in its hardware implementations. While many imperfections have been mitigated by countermeasures and advanced security proofs, several remain unsolved.…
Decoy-state methods [1-3] are essential to perform quantum key distribution (QKD) at large distances in the absence of single photon sources. However, the standard techniques apply only if laser pulses are used that are independent and…
Twin field quantum key distribution promises high key rates at long distance to beat the rate distance limit. Here, applying the sending or not sending TF QKD protocol, we experimentally demonstrate a secure key distribution breaking the…
A new class of quantum cryptography (QC) protocols that are robust against the most general photon number splitting attacks in a weak coherent pulse implementation has been recently proposed. In this article we give a quite exhaustive…