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Learning from repeated play in a fixed two-player zero-sum game is a classic problem in game theory and online learning. We consider a variant of this problem where the game payoff matrix changes over time, possibly in an adversarial…

Nash equilibrium is perhaps the best-known solution concept in game theory. Such a solution assigns a strategy to each player which offers no incentive to unilaterally deviate. While a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to always exist, the…

Predicting human decision-making under risk and uncertainty is a long-standing challenge in cognitive science, economics, and AI. While prior research has focused on numerically described lotteries, real-world decisions often rely on…

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit systematic risk-taking behaviors analogous to those observed in gambling psychology, including overconfidence bias, loss-chasing tendencies, and probability misjudgment. Drawing from behavioral economics…

Reinforcement Learning Algorithms (RLA) are useful machine learning tools to understand how decision makers react to signals. It is known that RLA converge towards the pure Nash Equilibria (NE) of finite congestion games and more generally,…

Reasoning and strategic behavior in social interactions is a hallmark of intelligence. This form of reasoning is significantly more sophisticated than isolated planning or reasoning tasks in static settings (e.g., math problem solving). In…

In recent work, semantic games of independence-friendly logic were studied in strategic form in terms of (mixed strategy) Nash equilibria. The class of strategic games of independence-friendly logic is contained in the class of win-loss,…

It is common to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies; however, experimental studies have demonstrated that Nash equilibrium is often a poor description of human players' behavior in unrepeated normal-form games. In this…

Theory of Mind (ToM) assesses whether models can infer hidden mental states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, which is essential for natural social interaction. Although recent progress in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) has boosted…

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly mediate economic and organisational processes, from automated customer support and recruitment to investment advice and policy analysis. These systems are often assumed to embody rational decision…

Advancing planning and reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) is one of the key prerequisites towards unlocking their potential for performing reliably in complex and impactful domains. In this paper, we aim to demonstrate…

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of…

The rapid advancement of LLMs sparked significant interest in their potential to augment or automate managerial functions. One of the most recent trends in AI benchmarking is performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) over longer time…

Strategic decision-making in multi-agent settings is a key challenge for large language models (LLMs), particularly when coordination and negotiation must unfold over extended conversations. While recent work has explored the use of LLMs in…

In the classical framework of local distributed network computing, it is generally assumed that the entities executing distributed algorithms are altruistic. However, in various scenarios, the value of the output produced by an entity may…

We present an interactive framework for evaluating whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit genuine "understanding" in a simple yet strategic environment. As a running example, we focus on Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS), which, despite its…

This paper considers the problem of inverse reinforcement learning in zero-sum stochastic games when expert demonstrations are known to be not optimal. Compared to previous works that decouple agents in the game by assuming optimality in…

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a…

Q-learning excels in learning from feedback within sequential decision-making tasks but often requires extensive sampling to achieve significant improvements. While reward shaping can enhance learning efficiency, non-potential-based methods…

LLM-driven multi-agent-based simulations have been gaining traction with applications in game-theoretic and social simulations. While most implementations seek to exploit or evaluate LLM-agentic reasoning, they often do so with a weak…